and Thailand the military has long been the final arbiter in political conflict.
When military regimes hand back power to civilian politicians, it is often to
people of their own choosing in a constitution of their own design. Military
leaders, including those who have conspired in the past to stage a coup,have
often turned themselves into politicians, creating new political parties, and
competing for political office. Venezuela’s President Chavaz, a ringleader of
the first of two coupsin 1992, is a case in point (Baburkin et al., 1999,
p. 153). Civilian politics in developing countries is often a veneer behind
which lies military power that is ready to take full control.
Most military coupsfall into one of four categories (Huntington, 1962,
1968). First there is the governmental or guardian coup– for example,
Pakistan in 1999. The military’s role is one of guardianship in the sense that
the new regime leaves the prevailing economic system intact, brings about
little fundamental change in government policy, and bases its right to rule
on the claim that its task is to provide a period of stability before handing
power back to civilians. The leadership of the government is changed, but
not the social or political structure. Perlmutter sees this type of coupas the
result of an ‘arbitrator army’ which accepts the existing social order, creates
no independent political organization, and expresses an intention to return
to barracks once the civilian disputes are settled or an alternative and
acceptable regime is established (Perlmutter, 1971, pp. 315–18).
Theveto coupoccurs when the military supplants a civilian government
that is committed to radical social and economic reform that will be to the
cost of the wealthier classes in society. Examples are Chile in 1973 and
Haiti in 1991 when the army ousted President Aristide, Haiti’s first demo-
cratically elected President who, because of his liberationist theology and
reformist programme, was idolized by the poor and hated by the rich and
their military allies.
A sub-set of the ‘veto’coupis the anticipatory veto, when the military
intervene to pre-empt power passing to a revolutionary or radical govern-
ment as distinct from the overthrow of an existing progressive and reformist
government. Ajub Khan’s coupin Pakistan in 1958 may be seen as one to
pre-empt the electoral success of a left-wing party (Woddis, 1977,
pp. 66–8). Similarly in Algeria in 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front,
with a programme of social change, won twice as many votes as its nearest
rival in the first of two ballots and the military cancelled the second round,
appointed a ‘High State Council’, and embarked on repression of the fun-
damentalist movement. Burma in 1990 is another example. An anticipatory
coupmay even be encouraged by the incumbent civilian government if
it fears it is about to lose power through the ballot box. In Zimbabwe
178 Understanding Third World Politics