sufficiently developed for the task. Political resources become spread over a
larger number of actors than in traditional societies where a privileged minor-
ity has command of political decision-making. In modern society power
becomes more dispersed, at least in principle if not in practice. Expectations
of a more equal dispersal of power are aroused. This is reflected in the right to
vote and to share in the selection of political leaders. Such participation needs
institutions through which it can operate in a structured and ordered way.
Procedures and organizations have to be created through which political
demands can be expressed effectively and decisions can be made which will
be regarded as legitimate and binding. Processes of government represent the
latter kind of organization. Parties and pressure groups represent the former,
required for people to protect and promote their interests effectively.
The propensity for military intervention will be reduced, the more such
institutionalization occurs (Huntington, 1968; Perlmutter, 1971). The higher
the levels of social mobilization, the higher the levels of political participa-
tion. If this is accompanied by the development of organizations through
which political participation can be channelled, the population will develop
a commitment to their civilian institutions and regime. They will see them as
effective means of obtaining access to power and the resources that follow
from it. The military will not find themselves in an environment conducive to
their intervention, over and above that of a technical and professional élite in
whose hands a major function of the state rests, that of national defence.
There is a related technological argument. Social mobility results from
changes in the level of economic development. This not only increases the
wealth and political significance of a wide range of groups with an interest
in preserving civilian forms of government. It also increases the technolog-
ical complexity of government and puts it beyond the grasp of the military.
A problem with this theory is that it is of too high a level of generality,
trying to provide a framework that can encompass all instances of military
intervention (Dowse, 1969). As soon as one tries to apply it to specific coun-
tries, all sorts of exceptions and variations begin to appear (see, for exam-
ple, Philip, 1984). The hypothesis that rapid social change will lead to
political violence and military intervention has received support from some
comparative studies but not others. For example, Putnam found negligible
correlations between military intervention in Latin America and political
participation and the strength of parties and pressure groups, leading him to
conclude that Huntington was mistaken in thinking that stable civilian rule
depends on strong political institutions. He also found that countries sharing
the same level of economic development were less prone to military inter-
vention if more socially mobilized. If two countries are equal in their levels
180 Understanding Third World Politics