perceived as having failed to modernize the economy via industrialization,
they run the risk of being ousted by frustrated sections of the modernizing
élite that are out of office. Evidence to support this is offered by McGowan
and Johnson, who examined military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa
between 1956 and 1984, and found that the lower the economic growth and
level of industrial employment, the higher the incidence of military inter-
vention in politics. However, as the authors recognize, causation is unlikely
to run in one direction: the political instability caused by coupshinders eco-
nomic development. ‘We are left with the image of a vicious circle in which
economic stagnation and decline lead to military interventions, which them-
selves in turn usually produce more economic uncertainty and stagnation’
(1984, p. 659; see also Johnson et al., 1984, p. 635).
Economic underdevelopment can work in other ways to encourage
coups. Dependence on primary export products whose world prices can
fluctuate wildly produces economic instability because a lack of a diversi-
fied economy means there are no alternative goods and services to offset
those fluctuations. This is conducive to coups, because it produces problems
which can be blamed on governments. When a very high proportion of tax
revenues comes from the export of a single commodity, the terms of trade
have an immediate impact on the ability of a government to develop the
economy and provide for the welfare of society. Government inevitably is
the focus of attention when the value of the country’s commodities falls in
world markets. So in a country which has a high level of specialization
because of the nature of its exports and a high level of dependence of its
economy on those export revenues, the probability of a successful coupis
increased (O’Kane, 1981).
There will always, however, be factors which will reduce the likelihood of a
coup. First there is the proximity of independence. Coupsare more likely the
longer a country is independent, giving governments time to demonstrate an
inability to cope. Secondly, there is the experience of military intervention –
what might be called internal contagion. Once a couphas occurred, there is
likely to be another. A country with no experience of the coup d’étatis less
likely to have one than a country where one has already taken place. Here the
military gain skills in domestic coercion, popular support for government is
discouraged by experience under the military, and subsequent periods of civil-
ian rule become increasing difficult to sustain. Thirdly, the presence of foreign
troops is an obstacle. They would not be present with the approval of the
domestic government in the first place if there was any chance of them being
sympathetic to military take-over. Even though there is evidence of foreign
powers encouraging rather than hindering coups, the presence of foreign
184 Understanding Third World Politics