102 Kant: A BiographyThis work outlined the metaphysical underpinnings of the kind of middle
system that the Living Forces had proposed. It was intended to overcome
the defects of the "crude theory of physical influence" and the defects of
Leibniz.^7 The harmony that Kant spoke of was not /»re-established, but
was established by "the mutual connection of things." At the same time,
Kant believed that this system was compatible with true faith. Character¬
istically, he closed the dissertation by noting that there are certainly
those who are consumed with a passion to hunt down distorted conclusions from pub¬
lished works, and are clever at extracting a kind of venom from the way others think.
As a matter of fact, it is perhaps possible that even in these views of ours, they may
twist something into a bad meaning ... I believe it is my part to let them luxuriate in
their opinion and not to worry that anyone perhaps may be disposed to judge my work
incorrectly. My business is to continue vigorously along the straight path of investiga¬
tion in a way appropriate to science. Accordingly, I ask, with proper respect, that those
who desire to see the liberal arts prosper may favor my efforts.^8
Echoing the Preface to the Living Forces, he promises to continue on the
course he started there without worrying about those who might continue
to persecute him for religious reasons.
Closely connected to the dissertation or the "New Exposition" was the
dissertation of 1756, entitled "The Use in Natural Philosophy of Meta¬
physics Combined with Geometry, Part I: Physical Monadology." Fred¬
erick II had ruled that one could obtain the position of full professor only
after holding at least three public defenses. The "Physical Monadology" was
submitted to fulfill this requirement.^9 Kant defended it on April 10,1756.
This work represents a further explication of the systematic background
of his physical theories. We can see that his fundamental position had not
changed between 1746 and 1756. He was still opting for the system that
mediates between Newton or Descartes and Leibniz. A full account of re¬
ality must involve monads, or "active beings," whose nature cannot be ex¬
plained by mathematical space with its arbitrary definitions. "Space ... is
divisible in infinitum, and does not consist of simple parts."^10 Bodies, on
the other hand, consist of simple elements, which cannot be divided any
further. One of Kant's most central points of the "Physical Monadology"
was to show that the indivisibility or simplicity of monads is not contradic¬
tory to the infinite divisibility of space. Kant offered as a reason that space,
as Leibniz had pointed out, is not substantial but "a phenomenon of cer¬
tain external relations of substances."^11 The monad "occupies" space by
its activity. It hinders other things from entering into its sphere of activity.
Indeed, the "force by which the simple element of a body fills its space is