Silent Years 203only these rational grounds that are objective; the sensitive ones are merely
subjective. "The categorical necessity of free actions is the necessity in ac¬
cordance with laws of the pure will, the (hypothetical) or conditional ne¬
cessity is that in accordance with the affected will."^30
In these notes Kant rejects Hutcheson's account of morality outright,
arguing that the "principle of Hutcheson is non-philosophical because it
introduces a new feeling as a basis for explanation. Secondly, while Hutch¬
eson suggests that the laws of sensibility are objective reasons," a moral
feeling — being sensible - cannot provide the foundation for objective moral
laws.^51 Such a foundation can only come from reason — or so Kant argues
in some of these reflections. He now claims:The concept a priori alone has true universality and is the principium of rules. Virtue
can only be judged in accordance with concepts and therefore a priori. Empirical judg¬
ment in accordance with intuition in pictures or experience gives no laws, but only
examples, which demand a concept a priori for judging.Therefore "all morality is based on ideas."^52 Furthermore, Kant claims that
"the practical sciences determine the value of the theoretical ones....
They are the first in intention. The goal is prior to the means. However,
in execution the theoretical ones are first."^53
Kant later made a number of cryptic remarks about the "primacy of
pure practical reason." They may have historical significance, for the be¬
ginnings of his critical philosophy are to a large extent moral. The devel¬
opment of Kant's moral view is important for understanding any part of
his mature theory. Only reason shows that we are autonomous and possess
dignity. This is why it is necessary to develop a "genuine metaphysics with¬
out any admixture of the sensible." Such a metaphysics would constitute
the only true knowledge we have of ourselves and would give foundation
or justification to our character.
Almost everything that Kant says about character in anthropology can
be translated to what he says about will in his moral philosophy. "Charac¬
ter" is the appearance of the will; a good character corresponds to the good
will, and an evil character to an evil will. Indeed, "will" is "character," but
character "completely freed from everything which may be only empirical
and thus belong to anthropology." When Kant parenthetically defined char¬
acter in the second Critique as the "practically consistent way of thinking
(Denkungsart) in accordance with unchangeable maxims," he hinted at
just that.^54