280 Kant: A Biographyinfluence all the others.^17 The "duties that have their roots in sociability
conform more to nature than those drawn from learning." Therefore, he
examines more thoroughly "what are the natural principles of human fel¬
lowship and community."^18 Duties having to do with our sociability take
precedence over some of the other duties, such as devotion to learning, for
instance. As Cicero puts it in Book I, "Let the following, then, be regarded
as settled: when choosing between duties, the chief place is accorded to the
class of duties grounded in human fellowship."^19 The other sources of
honorableness are really closely related to the second. Thus loftiness of
spirit reveals itself only in a fight for "common safety." It cannot be ex¬
hibited in a fight for one's own advantage. Modesty, restraint, or what is
"seemly" is at least in part bound up with one's social role. We are social
animals, and ethics is the study of ourselves within society. Cicero differ¬
entiates between things that are proper for us to do because of our uni¬
versal nature or because of the characteristics we share with everyone, and
those that we must do because we are the individuals we are.
Each person should hold on to what is his as far as it is not vicious, but is peculiar to
him, so that the seemliness that we are seeking might more easily be maintained. For
we must act in such a way that we attempt nothing contrary to universal nature; but
while conserving that, let us follow our own nature, so that even if other pursuits may
be weightier and better, we should measure our own by the rule of our own nature. For
it is appropriate neither to fight against nature nor to pursue anything that you cannot
attain.^20
What our own nature is depends to a large extent on our social role. So¬
ciability or cornmunicability is accordingly the most important principle
from which duty derives. This is clear from the very terms Cicero uses.
"Honorableness" and "the honorable" are translations oV'honestas" and
"honestum." Both have to do with the holding of an office or an honor.
Duties are thus essentially related to one's social standing. They are bound
up with something that is public, part of the sphere of the respublica or the
community. Duties make little sense outside of society. They are not in¬
ternal or subjective principles, but public demands on us. Insofar as some
of these duties are based on sociability as such, some duties will be uni¬
versal, but they remain duties we have as "citizens of the world."
Garve did not have any fundamental objection to any of these aspects of
duty in Cicero. He endorsed the view that duty was ultimately based in hu¬
man nature, that it could be traced back to the principles of self-preservation
and human fellowship, and that happiness (Glückseligkeit) is not only at the
root of duty, but is also always a motivating factor in moral decisions. Less