282 Kant: A BiographyCiceronian ethics that remains founded on common life, expressed by
such concepts of honor (honestas), faithfulness (fides), fellowship (societas),
and seemliness (decorum), is too superficial and unphilosophical for Kant.
For this reason, Kant rejected not just Cicero but all those who were try¬
ing to develop a Gceronian ethics. Moral duties cannot be derived from
honor or honorableness in any way. They are based on something we find
in ourselves and in ourselves only, namely, the concept of duty that we find
in our heart and in our reason. Morality is about who we genuinely are or
who we should be, and this has, according to Kant, nothing to do with our
social status.^26
In rejecting "honor," Kant also implicitly rejects one of the fundamen¬
tal principles of the society he lives in. The distinction of different estates
has no moral relevance. As moral agents we are all equal. Any attempt to
defend or justify social differences by appealing to morals must be rejected
as well. The conservative status quo must be challenged. In the context of
Prussia of 1785, these views must be called revolutionary. On the other
hand, they can also be characterized as an adaptation and further clarifi¬
cation of Frederick's own moral code to every moral agent and thus also
to every citizen of Prussia. Frederick had claimed that a
true prince exists only to work and not to enjoy himself. He must be dominated by the
feeling of patriotism, and the only goal to which he aspires must be: to achieve great
and benevolent measures of the welfare of his state. To this goal he must subordinate
all personal considerations, his self-love as well as his passions.... Justice must always
be the primary concern of the prince; while the welfare of his people must have prece¬
dence over every other interest. The ruler is far from being the arbitrary master of his
people; he is indeed, nothing other than its first servant.^27
Kant seems to be saying that we also must subordinate all personal consid¬
erations, self-love, and passions to the only goal to which it is worth aspir¬
ing, namely, to be moral. This has nothing to do with feeling and everything
to do with reason and the "idea of another and far worthier purpose of one's
existence."^28 We are in this way no different from the king - something
Frederick himself would not have disputed.
One of the more important reasons that led Kant to reject honor as a
genuine moral principle was his belief that anyone who relied on maxims of
honor rather than on maxims of pure morality also relied on self-interest
as a significant part of moral deliberations; and he was clearly right about
this. It is not so clear whether he was right when he later claimed against
Garve and Cicero that