284 Kant: A Biographysynthetic one. In the analytic part he develops an analysis of the common
idea of this supreme moral principle and determines its nature and its
sources. The central concept of the first section, which is entitled "Tran¬
sition from Common Rational to Philosophic Cognition," is that of a good
will (corresponding to the idea of a good character in anthropology).^35
Kant claims that a good will is not good because of its effects or because
it produces some preconceived end, but only because of its own volition.
Indeed, a good will is the only thing that is good without any qualification.
In order to explain what he means by a good will, Kant introduces a dis¬
tinction between acting from duty and acting in accordance with duty. He
apparently thought that duty is what a good will would will. Still, many of
our actions, which are in agreement with what a good will would will, do
not really deserve moral praise because they are done from an ulterior mo¬
tive. They are not done simply because they are our duty but because they
happen to be in our interest. They thus accord with duty, but they were not
done from duty. Indeed, we may assume that most of our actions are done
in accordance with duty and not from duty. We always may have — and usu¬
ally do have — self-serving interests in what we do. We may be honest, for
instance, not simply because honesty is always the right course of action,
but rather because honesty is the best policy, or because we simply "like"
to be honest. So, a shopkeeper who treats all his customers with equal fair¬
ness and does not take advantage of strangers or children, may do so not be¬
cause he is convinced that this is the moral thing to do, but because he re¬
alizes that it will be good for business in the long run. When we help a needy
person, we may do so because it makes us feel good, or because we hope
that others will follow the same policy. None of these are truly moral mo¬
tives for Kant. Since self-interest seems to be inextricably interwoven with
our actions, it is quite possible that a moral act has never been committed,
but this does not mean that we should not strive to perform such acts.
Thus, actions have moral worth only when done from duty. But this moral
worth is not to be found in the purpose or the goal that they are meant to
attain. They have their moral worth only in the subjective principle of
volition that they express. Kant calls this practical principle of volition "the
maxim." As we have seen, maxims are general principles of action. They
define not so much particular acts as certain courses of action. In the con¬
text of anthropology or psychology, they can be described as character-
building devices. In the context of pure moral philosophy concerned with
the formal aspect of morality, they are decisive in determining whether a
will is morally good or not.