288 Kant: A BiographyOther Ideas: Against "Laziness and Cowardice"
and for "Careful Adherence to Principle"
As soon as Kant had sent his Groundwork to the publisher, he began to work
on some contributions to the Berlinische Monatsschrift.^55 The first of these
was his essay entitled "Ideas for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan
Point of View," which appeared in the November issue of the Berlinische
Monatsschrift of 1784.^56 The essay was a response to a remark published in
the Gothaische gelehrte Zeitungen on February 11, in which it was claimed:
It is a favorite idea of Herr professor Kant that the ultimate goal of the human race is
the establishment of a perfect constitution. He desires that a philosophical historiog¬
rapher would undertake it to write a history of mankind from this perspective in order
to show whether mankind has come closer to this final goal at some time, has strayed
from it at other times, and what still remains to be done to achieve it.
In the essay Kant argues that such a historiography is possible only if we
assume that nature (or perhaps better, Nature) has certain characteristics.
Put in another way, he claims that a certain Idea of Nature is a necessary
condition of "universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view." There¬
fore, we may say that if a "universal history from a cosmopolitan point of
view" is legitimate, then a certain idea of Nature is also legitimate. There¬
fore we can also say that the "universal history" forms a "justification of
Nature - or rather perhaps of providence.'" Indeed, Kant claims that such
a project "is no mean motive for adopting a particular point of view in
considering the world." For, he says,
what is the use of lauding and holding up for contemplation the glory and wisdom of
creation in the non-rational sphere of nature, if the history of mankind, the very part
of this great display of supreme wisdom which contains the purpose of all the rest, is
to remain a constant reproach to everything else? Such a spectacle would force us to
turn away in revulsion, and, by making us despair of ever finding any completed ra¬
tional aim behind it, would reduce us to hoping for it only in some other world.^57
So Kant argues for a teleological view of Nature by arguing that such a view
is required for a history of the progress of humanity. This strategy of argu¬
ment is, of course, reminiscent of that of the "transcendental arguments"
Kant puts forward in other contexts. Nevertheless, it must be observed that
his "justification of Nature" is weak. Only if we think that such a history
(or "grand narrative") is possible or necessary, do we have to accept his con¬
clusion. The presupposition of the Idea of Progress is not a presupposition
necessary for action, as is the presupposition of the Idea of Freedom.