346 Kant: A Biography
argues that although aesthetic judgments are based on feeling, their claims
to objective validity are not based on these feelings themselves but upon a
priori principles of judgment that are preconditions for such feelings. Kant
also deals in this work with the problem of the unity of his own system, the
general problem of the apparent purposiveness of nature, the problems
arising from a presumed necessity of applying teleological concepts in
biology, and some theological concerns.
The Critique of Judgement is divided into two parts, the Critique of Aes¬
thetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment. Both parts have
an Analytic and a Dialectic, but the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment is
followed by a long Appendix on the method of applying teleological judg¬
ment and a general remark on teleology.^59 Kant's divisions are largely ex¬
pressions of his desire for architectonic neatness. However, especially in
the second part, these architectonic concerns seem to get in the way rather
than help. The Appendix and Note are as long as the Analytic and Dialectic
together. It is far from clear whether the division, which may have served
Kant well in the first Critique, serves any essential function here.
The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment deals with the problem of the va¬
lidity of aesthetic judgments. This problem arises from a peculiarity of the
claims we make about aesthetic matters. When we claim, for instance, that
"this painting by Rembrandt is beautiful" or that "the Grand Canyon is sub¬
lime," we express our feelings and do not make claims to objective knowl¬
edge. At the same time, such claims, which may be called judgments of
taste, are meant to be more than mere reports of what we feel. We are
convinced that there is more to such judgments, that they state something
of universal significance. What justifies such convictions?
In the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant first outlines four characteristics
of judgments of taste, or rather, of one of their subjects, namely beauty. He
tries to show that we may impute universality because judgments of taste
are estimations of objects in which we find delight or aversion apart from
any interest we may have in them. So what is beautiful delights us without
any interest. Second, the beautiful is something that pleases universally,
apart from any concept we have of it. Kant argues that judgments about
pleasure cannot possibly approach the intersubjective validity of judgments
about objects. But that would be required if such judgments were to involve
concepts. Third, beauty is "the form of functionality of an object, so far
as it is perceived apart from the representation of a purpose."^60 Differen¬
tiating between two kinds of beauty, namely, free and dependent beauty,
where free beauty presupposes no concept of what the object should be and
dependent beauty does presuppose such a concept, Kant argues that judg-