Kant: A Biography

352 Kant: A Biography

(aechtphilosophisches Publikum).^85 Dogmatic skepticism, on the other hand,

is a "worthy opponent." It has to be disproved so that we can reach "that

important doubt of critical skepticism," which, for him, marks the begin¬

ning of something new.^86 Critical skepticism is not part of traditional phi¬

losophy. Indeed, as he argues in another paper that appeared in the very same

year in Der Teutsche Merkur, only "critical skepticism" can free a critical

thinker from the necessity of adhering to any of the traditional parties in

philosophy, and enable him to fight all of them.^87

Dogmatic skepticism obviously has a special significance for critical

philosophy. It seems to be, for Reinhold, the most important enemy, and

his paper is designed to put as much distance between it and critical skep¬

ticism as possible. This is relatively easy, given his definition of "dogmatic

skepticism."

It bears the name "dogmatic skepticism" because it attempts to demonstrate that we

must forever doubt objective truth, that is, the real agreement of our representations

with their object. The indemonstrability of objective truth constitutes the dogma of

this sect. It can co-exist only through an obvious, though therefore no less common,

inconsistency with philosophical convictions which presuppose necessity and univer¬

sality.... Critical Skepticism doubts what dogmatic skepticism considers as settled.

It seeks the foundations of the demonstrability of objective truths, while the latter be¬

lieves to be in possession of reasons for the indemonstrability of objective truth. The

one executes and prescribes an investigation, which the other declares to be futile and

superfluous, and thus, as much as is possible for him, makes impossible.^88

As any member of Reinhold's "aechtphilosophisches Publikum''' could see
right away, dogmatic skepticism is really inconsistent, and only critical skep¬
ticism can be considered to be true skepticism. One would hope that they
also saw right away, that the inconsistency was one introduced by Reinhold's
definition.^89
It is significant, however, that in 1789 the critical point of view, for Rein-
hold, was a skeptical point of view, and not one that gave rise to any posi¬
tive claims. Indeed, it was, so far as doctrinal content is concerned, more
negative than traditional skepticism, at least as characterized by Reinhold.
The most important characteristic of the critical skeptic was his more open
attitude. But this constitutes only the beginning of Reinhold's objection
to skepticism. Holding onto his definition of "dogmatic skepticism," and
still claiming that "dogmatic skepticism" needs to be refuted, he not only
abandoned "critical skepticism" as a position, but also banished the name
from his vocabulary. Indeed, in some of his later writings he went so far as
to argue that skepticism, in order to be philosophical at all, must be dog-