362 Kant: A Biographyof the world-government against doubts raised against it on the basis of
what the experience of the world teaches."^127 While the doubts are not de¬
cisive either, traditional theodicy is a failure. Using Job as an example,
Kant argues that faith can never be the result of insight into God's plans
or the nature of the world. We should admit our ignorance and thus also
our doubts. What is needed in religious matters is only "sincerity of heart,"
"openly admitting one's doubts," and "repugnance to pretending convic¬
tion where one feels none." Job's faith came from his moral disposition not
to lose his integrity even under the greatest pressure. "He did not found
his morality on faith, but his faith on morality." Even though every
"higher consistory in our times (one alone excepted)" would likely have
condemned Job, he was more pleasing to God than were his judges.^128 The
reference was obvious to any reader of the essay in 1791. The king, just like
the Pietists in Kant's youth, was declaring that people should pretend con¬
viction even if there was none - and this was something Kant was unwill¬
ing to do. "Sincerity of heart" was more important than what any higher
consistory might demand.
Kant believed he had shown that theodicy has little to do with the in¬
terests of science. It was "a matter of faith."^129 But more importantly, it
was a matter of honesty. While one cannot always vouch for the truth of
what one says, one "can and must stand by the truthfulness of one's decla¬
ration or confession, because one has immediate consciousness of this."
But one of the basic presuppositions of truthfulness is our paying atten¬
tion to whether we really consider something to be true when we declare
it true, so that we never pretend that we believe something to be true when
we are not consciously holding it true. Self-deception is the root of
hypocrisy. Someone who declared that he believed "without perhaps cast¬
ing even a single glimpse into himself" would be committing the "most sin¬
ful" lie, for such a lie "undermines the ground of every virtuous inten¬
tion."^130 Sincerity is the property "farthest removed from human nature,"
yet it is the minimal condition of character.^131
Kant's claims in the theological sections of the third Critique seemed at
the very least questionable to Frederick William II and his censors. But his
remarks about sincerity, hypocrisy, and character were openly critical of
the activities of the "higher consistories" and their policies. Insofar as their
mandate came directly from the king in Berlin, Kant was criticizing him.
This would not have been lost on those in power in Berlin.
The Rosicrucian cronies of the king were continuing to move against
the advocates of the Enlightenment. The French Revolution made them