The Old Man 397more important. They are prescribed by the categorical imperative, and
they are the expressions of our autonomous reason. Juridical duties, which
have to do with actions that we can be forced to perform by others, turn
out to be only indirectly ethical. Juridical laws and duties are connected
with rights that other persons have, and though we should do what others
can rightfully demand of us, we do not have to perform such acts from a
moral motive.
Yet, not all external laws are created the same. There are some that are
merely positive laws, that is, laws adopted by a certain state or other polit¬
ical body, and there are others that are "prescriptive natural laws," or laws
that can be derived from the categorical imperative. Only the latter are
juridical.
External freedom is the absence of external constraint, or constraint by
other agents. It can never be unlimited, but must necessarily be under¬
stood as limited by the legitimate concerns of others. Kant therefore for¬
mulates the following Universal Principle of Right, which states: "Any
action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with
a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can co¬
exist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law."^58 This
gives rise to a universal law of right, which commands us to act externally
so that our free choice "can coexist with the freedom of everyone in ac¬
cordance with universal law."^59 However, this law itself does not have to
be an incentive to action; it is meant to remind us of the limits upon our free
actions.
Juridical duties or duties of right come in two divisions for Kant. There
are private (or natural) rights, and public (or civil) rights. By far the largest
part of the Doctrine of Right deals with private rights. Kant discusses in
separate chapters "How to Have Something External as One's Own" (Chap¬
ter 1), "How to Acquire Something External" (Chapter 2), and "Acquisi¬
tion That Is Dependent Subjectively Upon the Decision of a Public Court
of Justice" (Chapter 3). In the first chapter Kant tries to explain and jus¬
tify the legal concept of ownership. To get his point, it is necessary to
understand the difference between mere physical possession and rightful
ownership, a concept central to Roman law (and almost absent in common
law). According to this conception, possession and ownership are radically
distinct. I may physically possess something without owning it, and I may
own something without being in possession of it. Thus if I lend my car to
you, you possess it, but I still own it. While it is possible to possess some¬
thing rightfully, it is also possible to possess it without having a right to it.