The Old Man 413Again, this stands in stark contrast to Kant's own critical doctrine and es¬
pecially to his refutation of idealism. From the point of view of the first
Critique, this is just nonsense, but it makes perfect sense according to one
conception of his project in the Opus postumum. If we understand it as
"Philosophy as Wissenschaftslehre in a Complete System," which is after
all one title Kant considered for it, then it makes sense. This would also
mean that Kant had made the move to Fichtean idealism. Though he
never mentions Fichte in the Opus postumum, and though there is evidence
that he disliked Fichte personally, his talk of "self-positing" in the Opus
postumum is clearly Fichtean.^117 Yet it is of little consequence whether
Kant was more influenced by Beck, Fichte, or Schelling. Nor is it clear
whether Kant would have endorsed the arguments in a published version
of the book. He might just have been trying to understand Fichte's posi¬
tion by writing it out in his own way. What is important is that he is no
longer elaborating his own theories, but adapting the views of others. They
are some of the "exceptional combinations and projects" that Pörschke
claimed Kant was still capable of as late as 1798, but they are not repre¬
sentative of Kant's best thinking. While this does not mean that they are
without philosophical interest, they are of lesser importance to Kant's
philosophical legacy.
Decline and Death (1799—1804): "Consider Me as a Child""From the winter semester of 1798-99 Kant's name no longer appeared
in the registers of the courses given at the university."^118 Though he had
not lectured from 1796 on, by 1799 it became all too clear that Kant could
never teach again. That year also saw the last independent publication by
Kant himself, namely the "Open Declaration" against Fichte, which was
Kant's last word on current philosophical developments. He took leave of
the school and from the public, saying:I hereby declare that I regard Fichte's Theory of Science [Wissenschaftslehre] as a totally
indefensible system. For the pure theory of science is nothing more or less than mere
logic, and the principles of logic cannot lead to any material knowledge ... Since some
reviewers maintain that the Critique is not to be taken literally in what it says about
sensibility and that anyone who wants to understand the Critique must first master the
requisite "standpoint" (of Beck or of Fichte), because Kant's precise words, like Aris¬
totle's, will kill the mind, I therefore declare again that the Critique is to be understood
by considering exactly what it says.. ,^119