Kant: A Biography

Notes to Pages 144—151 461

Chapter 4: A Palingenesis and Its Consequences (1764-1769)

1. Ak 7 (Anthropologie), p. 201.


2. Ak 7, p. 294.


3. Ak 7, 294^; compare Ak 25.1 (Antropologie Collins), p. 150.


4. Ak 25.1 (Anthropologie Friedländer), p. 629; see also p. 353.


5. Ak 25.1 (Anthropologie Friedländer), p. 523.


6. Ak 25.1 (Anthropologie Friedländer), p. 617.


7. Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
   1990), p. 136. Allison does not endorse this view


8. See also Ak 9, p. 475.


9. Ak 25.2 (Anthropologie Pillau), p. 822.


10. Ak 25.2 (Anthropologie Mrongovius), p. 1385.


11. Borowski, Leben, p. 71.


12. See Lehmann, "Kants Lebenskrise," pp. 411-421. Lehmann argues that Kant
    underwent such a "life crisis" in 1764. He takes the "Observations on the Feeling
    of the Beautiful and Sublime" as an indication of it, but he sees it entirely in the¬
    oretical terms, wanting to understand his "Denkkrisen als Lebenskrisen''' (p. 412).
    This is too one-sided.


13. Hamann, Briefwechsel, II, pp. 82, 119. This fallow period lasted until the end of
    his life. Hamann, who was very interested in Kypke's library and manuscripts
    during 1779-80, found nothing of significance in his literary remains.


14. Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, tr. and ed. Allan W. Wood and
    George DiGiovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 277f
    (Ak 7, pp. 5sf).


15. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, p. 280 (Ak 7, p. 59). Compare p. 367, this
    volume.


16. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, p. 280 (Ak 7, p. 58).


17. Ak 25.2 (Menschenkunde), p. 1174.


18. It is all-too-often forgotten that for the ancient philosophers, philosophy was more
    a "way of life," akin to "religion," than a theoretical pursuit in our sense of the
    term. See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, tr. A. I. Davidson (London:
    Blackwell, 1995); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and
    Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), espe¬
    cially pp. 383^


19. Plato, Republic, 604E.


20. Ak 7, p. 104, emphasis supplied.


21. In his draft for the Dispute of the Faculties, he said: "I formulated rules for myself
    early on," attributing his long life to these rules (Ak 23, p. 463).


22. See "Insanity," in John W. Yolton et al. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the En¬
    lightenment (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1991). See also Böhme and
    Böhme, Das Andere der Vernunft, pp. 389^ True to form, the Böhmes claim that
    hypochondria "is a product of the Enlightenment." In particular, "the denial of
    affects, the discipline of the body, and the thorough intellectualization of the
    entire world (Dasein) led to a deep malfunctioning of the immediate bodily exis¬
    tence" (p. 419). Kant's hypochondria is the result of his rationalism. This is false.