Notes to Pages 182-186 469- Kant, Ak 16, p. 457 [Refl. 2660]; see also Logik Blomberg (1771), Ak 24.1, pp. 36,
83, 2i2f., 105, 159. Kant claims that the "tendency to decide is the most certain
way to error" and ascribes "dogmatic pride" to many philosophers. Compare also
Giorgio Tonelli, "Kant und die antiken Skeptiker," in Studien zu Kants philosophis¬
cher Entwicklung, ed. Dieter Henrich and Giorgio Tonelli (Hildesheim: Olms,
1967). This is a useful Materialübersicht. See also Enno Rudolph, Skepsis bei Kant.
Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (München: Eugen Fink
Verlag, 1978) and Ludwig Weber, Das Distinktionsverfahren im mittelalterlichen
Denken und Kants skeptische Methode (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain,
1976). - Ak 24.1 (Logik Herder), p. 4.
- Ak 27.1 (Praktische Philosophie Herder), p 23.
- Ak 27.1 (Praktische Philosophie Herder), p. 79.
- Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, p. 316 (Ak 2, p. 329).
- Kant, Correspondence, tr. Zweig, p. 55.
- Beck, "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," pp. 6sf. Ameriks also emphasizes
the skeptical dimension in Kant's writings of this period. - Dieter Henrich, "The Concept of Moral Insight," tr. Manfred Kuehn, in D. Hen-
rich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy, ed. R. Velkley (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 55-88. - Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und der freyen Künste, II, 2 (1759). I quote
from the 2nd. ed. of 1762, pp. 29of. - Allgemeine Theorie des Denkens und Empfindens was the title of a book by Johann
August Eberhard (Berlin, 1776). The book was a response to a question by the
Prussian Academy, asking for a more precise theory of thinking and sensation.
Eberhard reported that the question specifically demanded that "(i) one precisely
develop the original conditions of this twofold power of the soul as well as its
general laws; (ii) thoroughly investigate how these two powers of the soul are de¬
pendent on each other, and how they influence each other; and (iii) indicate the
principles according to which we can judge how far the intellectual ability (ge¬
nius) and the moral character of man depends upon the degree of the force and
liveliness as well as on the increase of those two mental faculties.. ." (pp. I4f). - Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. F. Bamberger et al. (Stuttgart/
Bad Canstatt, 1931-), II, p. 183. - Mendelssohn, Schriften, II, p. 184.
- I borrow this term from Lewis White Beck, Kant Selections (New York/London:
Scribner Macmillan Publishing Co., 1988), p. 28. But whereas he uses it to refer
to the continuity of science and metaphysics, I use it to designate his related view
on the relation of sensibility and reason. - Immanuel Kant, Enquiry into the Distinctness of the Fundamental Principles of Nat¬
ural Theology and Morals, in Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings on
Moral Philosophy, tr. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949), P-285 (Ak 2, p. 300). - Kant, Of the Beautiful and Sublime, tr. Goldthwait, p. 60 (Ak 2, p. 217).
- Kant, Of the Beautiful and Sublime, tr. Goldthwait, p. 59. See also p. 74, where he
finds that "good-hearted impulses" cannot be estimated as "a particular merit of