Notes to Pages 194—198 471
68, p. 66. There is an English translation of this review in Johann Schultz, Expo¬
sition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, tr. James C. Morrison (Ottawa: University
of Ottawa Press, 1995).
- Ak 10, p. 133.
- Ak 10, p. 134; Lambert made essentially the same objection, Kant thought. He
also dismissed another objection as a misunderstanding.
- Kant, Correspondence, tr. Zweig, p. 74 (Ak 10, p. 133).
- Kant, Correspondence, tr. Zweig, pp. Ö7f. (Ak 10, pp. iißf.)-
- Kant, Latin Writings, ed. Beck, p. 134 (Ak 2, p. 399).
- Kant, Correspondence, tr. Zweig, p. 69 (Ak 10, p. 115).
- Kant, Correspondence, tr. Zweig, pp. 6()i. (Ak 10, pp. usf.).
- Kant, Correspondence, tr. Zweig, p. 66 (Ak 10, pp. no).
- Lambert did not just claim this but tried to prove it in the remainder of the letter.
An analysis of the arguments would lead too far afield, but they impressed Kant
and made him think harder on the problems he had tackled in the dissertation.
- Ak 10, p. 132.
- Lambert reviewed it in the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek 20 (1773), p. 227, and
characterized it as a further elaboration of comments made at the thesis defense
that did not go much beyond Kant.
- Markus Herz, Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit, ed. Elfried Conrad,
Heinrich P. Delfosse, and Birgit Nehren (Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1990), p. 64.
- Herz, Betrachtungen, p. 64.
- Herz, Betrachtungen, pp. 64f. He continues: "No doubt, you will object to the view
I maintain here by citing a case in which the cause precedes the effect in the order
of nature, but in which, in accordance with existence, both are simultaneous, such
as fire and light. Here the former contains the cause of the latter, but can still never
exist without the latter. Yet, however undeniably this can be proved by pure reason,
you will find by a more exact observation of the way in which we represent it to us
that whenever we think of fire and light, we do not think of them as cause and ef¬
fect but as determinations which constantly co-exist in a common subject. As soon
as we call one of these the cause of the other, we implicitly presuppose that there
was some moment at which the one existed without the other. It is entirely im¬
possible for us to think an efficient cause without representing it to ourselves as
being concerned — as it were — with the production of the effect. This is what forces
us to assign to the cause a moment at which it still seemed to be at work."
- The editor of Hamann's Complete Works believed that it was Hamann's work and
included it as one of his original works. See Johann Georg Hamann, Sämtliche
Werke, ed. Josef Nadler (Wien, 1949-1953), IV, pp. 364-370.
- See Rudolf Unger, Hamann und die Aufklärung. Studien zur Vorgeschichte des ro¬
mantischen Geistes im 18. Jahrhundert, 2nd ed. (Halle, 1925), II, p. 932. See also
Charles W. Swain, "Hume and the Philosophy of David Hume," Journal of the
History of Philosophy 5 (1967), pp. 343-351.
- David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., ed. L. A. Selby Bigge (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1985).
- Hume, Treatise, p. 272. See also O. Bayer, "Hamann's Metakritik im ersten Ent¬
wurf," Kant-Studien 81 (1990), pp. 435-453. Bayer notes the change to "in our
