472 Notes to Pages 198-199
land," but not the missing last paragraph. So anyone who did not know Hume's
Treatise very well - and there were not many in eighteenth-century Germany who
did - would certainly have been justified in assuming that Hamann was the au¬
thor. It is perhaps not quite so easily to be excused that several of the editors of
Hamann's work have made this mistake. The most egregious mistake is probably
the one by Stefan Majetschak, whose Vom Magus im Norden und der Verwegenheit
des Geistes. Ein Hamann Brevier (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988)
contains the first part of the translation as Hamann's original text long after it
should have been known to anyone that it was not Hamann's own work.- Hume, Treatise, p. 266. If we define an "antinomy" as a contradiction between the
basic principles of the human mind, then this passage does contain an antinomy.
For more on this, see Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (1983), pp. 175-193, and "Hume's Anti¬
monies," Hume Studies 9 (April 9, 1983), pp. 25-45, as weU as "Kant's Transcen¬
dental Deduction: A Limited Defense of Hume," in New Essays on Kant, ed. Bernard
den Ouden (New York/Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 1988), pp. 47-72, and "Reid's
- Contribution to Hume's Problem," in The Science of Man in the Scottish Enlight¬
enment: Hume, Reid, and their Contemporaries, ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: Uni¬
versity of Edinburgh Press, 1989), pp. 124-148. The paper on "Kant's Conception
Hume's Problem" has created some controversy — especially in Germany. Much
of this controversy is due to the fact that Lothar Kreimendahl and Günter Gawlick
took over much of my story in their Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung: Umrisse einer
Rezeptionsgeschichte (Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 1987). Agreeing that the
translated passage offers an antinomy, and that it was this passage that awakened
Kant, Gawlick and Kreimendahl criticized my dating of Kant's awakening to 1771
and offered a somewhat different interpretation of why Hume's Antinomies were
important to Kant. In particular, they claimed that Kant read the Humean "Night
Thoughts" two years earlier, i. e., in 1769, and that Hume's Antinomies led Kant
to formulate the final version of his own doctrine of the Antinomies. Kreimendahl
elaborated this view further in Kant - Der Durchbruch von 176g (Köln: Dinter,
- Several of the critics of Gawlick and Kreimendahl's work also found it
necessary to criticize my position (and most of these have criticized it as if it
were essentially the same as theirs). See Rudolf Liithe, review of G. Gawlick and
L. Kreimendahl, Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung in Philosophischer Literatu¬
ranzeiger 40 (1987), pp. 209-212; Lewis White Beck, review of G. Gawlick and
L. Kreimendahl, Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung in Eighteenth-Century Studies
21 (1988), pp. 405-408; Wolfgang Carl, review of G. Gawlick and L. Kreimen¬
dahl, Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung in Philosophische Rundschau 35 (1988),
pp. 207-214, p. 211; Wolfgang Carl, Der schweigende Kant. Die Entwürfe zu einer
Deduktion der Kategorien vor ij8i, Abhandlungen Akademie Göttingen 182 (Göt¬
tingen/Zürich: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1989), pp. 50, 150, 156; and Reinhard
Brandt, review of L. Kreimendahl, Der Durchbruch von 176g in Kant-Studien 83
(1992), pp. 100-111. The only one who properly differentiates my position from
that of Gawlick and Kreimendahl is Lome Falkenstein, "The Great Light of 1769 —
A Humeian Awakening? Comments on Lothar Kreimendahl's Account of Hume's
Influence on Kant," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (1995), pp. 63-79. As