CASE STUDIES/211We are currently living through a profound political crisis. It is not
a crisis of the building of a system, but rather of its very ability to
function and reproduce itself. It is fundamentally a crisis affecting
the three constituent dimensions of the state: firstly, the way the
regime is structured; secondly, the relationship of domination
between rulers and the ruled; thirdly, the functioning and repro
duction of the ruling elite. This is not a government crisis, nor is it
a crisis of the current ruling group. Rather, the current crisis is a
crisis of the very form of the state. (Viento del Sur, Mexico City, July
1994)The crisis began with the 1988 elections, which were won by the
main opposition candidate, Cardenas. He was denied victory through
an enormous PRI-orchestrated electoral fraud. A huge mass
movement against the fraud shook the regime. The January 1994
Zapatista rebellion was the second shock wave, amplified by the
December 1994 economic crisis. The latest blow to the regime was
the July 1997 elections. Taken together, these knocks have
sharpened conflicts within the regime itself. Thus far, however, the
country has not seen a rising momentum of social forces capable of
delivering a knock-out blow to the regime, as part of a process of
growing experience, strength and consciousness. The direction taken
after 1988 by the main progressive opposition party, the PRD, has
disoriented and profoundly disappointed broad sectors of the mass
movement (Toussaint, 1996c). Thanks to the EZLN's boldness and
the gigantic mobilisation against repression of the indigenous
rebellion, it was able to force the regime to the negotiating table
between 1994 and 1996.
But the regime still has a number of tricks up its sleeve; for example,
it led negotiations with the EZLN into an impasse. It has succeeded in
waging a low-intensity war against grassroots movements, especially
against small farmers and indigenous communities, by placing the
army on a permanent war footing in a number of states (Chiapas,
Guerrero, Oaxaca, Tabasco). In two years, the Mexican army has
grown considerably; most of the armed forces are permanently
deployed outside barracks. The judiciary and police apparatus have
also grown more active; more and more grassroots activists are being
arrested, leading many movements to turn inwards. The dirtiest
repressive work is carried out by private militia linked to big capitalists
and landowners ensconced in the PRI machine. The December 1997