according to which one means by ‘water’ (say) something like: ‘StuVwhich
is the same asthisin its basic composition’. So the most incisive line of
attack will be directed against singular thoughts such as those about
ostended samples, on which indexical concepts must ultimately depend.
2.2 Arguments for externalist folk psychologyWhat reason is there to believe that singular thoughts are Russellian
(constitutively involving the object thought about) as well as Fregean?
That is, why should one believe (roughly) thatsame content = same
reference + same mode of presentation? One bad argument, which is never-
theless frequently to be found in the literature, is that we routinelydescribe
such thoughts in terms of their objects. We say ‘John thinks thatthatcat is
dangerous’; ‘Mary thinks thatJohnis a coward’; and so on.
Now, this certainly does not show anything very much by itself. For the
fact that we individuate, describe, or pick out, something by its relation to
another does not show that the latterWgures amongst theidentity con-
ditionsof the thing in question. Thus, I might pick out Big Ben tower in
London for you by saying, ‘It is the clock-tower which stands next to the
Houses of Parliament’. But this does not make the Parliament building
constitutive of the identity of Big Ben. On the contrary, we think that the
former could be destroyed, for example, while leaving the latter the very
same as it was. So, the fact that I individuate John’s thought for you by
indicating the particular cat he is thinking about, does not show that the
cat in question is a constitutive part of, or essential to the existence and
identity of, his thought.
There are, however, cases in which we might be tempted to insist that
distinct thoughts are entertained, where the only available distinguishing
feature is the diVerence in their objects. For example, suppose that Mary
and Joan walk into diVerent butexactly similarburger bars, and sit down
at identical tables in the corner. Each then thinks, ‘This table is greasy.’
Since one of these thoughts might be true while the other is false (in Joan’s
case the table may only be wet), it looks as if we need to insist that the
thoughts belong to distinct types. But there is nothing in the mode(s) of
presentation of the tables to distinguish them. The diVerence must then lie
with their objects – that is to say, in the numerical diVerence between the
two tables. So, in contrast with the Big Ben example above, it might be held
that it is no mere accident that we would describe these thoughts by
indicating which table is in question – by saying, for example, ‘Mary is
thinking thatthattable (the one in front of her) is greasy, whereas Joan is
thinking thatthattable (the one in front ofher) is greasy’.
But this argument just assumes, without defence, that it is thought-types
136 Content for psychology