from the arguments above, that the notion extracted had better be a
narrow one.
Supposing that there are some psychological (content involving)laws
(ornomic tendencies, at least), what can be concluded about the notion of
content likely toWgure in those laws (or tendencies)? Much, of course,
depends upon what kinds of law may be in question. Some putative
psychological laws operate byquantifying overcontent, for example; in
which case nothing much can be concluded about the nature of such
content. Thus, consider the practical reasoning syllogism:
("x)("P)("Q)(if x wants that P, and x believes that, by bringing it about that Q, x
can succeed in bringing it about that P, and x believes that it is now within x’s
power to bring it about that Q, then –ceteris paribus– x will act in such a way as to
try to bring it about that Q).
It does not seem as if this can throw any light on the nature of the contents
PandQ. But some putative psychological laws will involve particular
contents or types of content – such as the law that the moon looks bigger
near the horizon; or that people have an aversion to mother–son incest; or
that people will (ceteris paribus) act so as to avoid or deXect a perceived
threat. Here, plainly, the contents involved had better be typed narrowly, if
the laws are to achieve the requisite generality. For example, if the law of
threats involves a content such as, ‘Thatis a threat to me’, then this content
will need to be individuated non-relationally, so that many diVerent think-
ers, entertaining demonstrative thoughts about many diVerent things, can
nevertheless be encompassed by the law. So to re-iterate: if there is a notion
of content which gains its life and signiWcance from the way in which it
Wgures in (putative) psychological laws, then there is good reason to expect
that notion to involve narrow (non-relational) principles of individuation.
It may be objected that at least some scientiWc laws appeal to properties
which are individuated relationally. Consider the scientiWc discovery that
malaria is caused by mosquito bites, for example. Here we have a law (or
nomic tendency) relating the property of suVering from malaria, on the
one hand, to the property ofhaving a bite which was caused by a mosquito,
on the other – that is to say, a property which is individuated by its relation
to another thing (the mosquito). So why should not psychology, similarly,
formulate its laws in terms of properties of the agent individuated by
relation to things external to the agent? But in fact there is no nomic
connection between mosquito bites and malaria. The relevant law will
relate malaria to the presence of a certain sort of parasite in the blood-
stream. And it just so happens that the normal causal route by means of
which those parasites enter the bloodstream is a bite from a mosquito. But
it is a real possibility that in the course of evolution those parasites might
150 Content for psychology