context-sensitive one, with varying application-conditions). Here, as so
often in philosophy, what matters is not what notion we actually do have;
but rather what notion weshouldhave, given our purposes (see Carruthers,
1987b; see also Craig, 1990).
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have rebutted arguments for the ubiquity of wide
content and against the coherence of narrow content. We have argued that
narrow content is not only coherent, but is also the notion which should be
employed for purposes of psychological explanation, whether folk or
scientiWc. We have also allowed that we should employ a notion of content
which is wide, in communicative contexts where our interests are belief-
acquisitive.
selected reading
In defence of wide content: Putnam, 1975a; Burge, 1979, 1986a, 1986b; Evans,
1981, 1982; McDowell, 1986, 1994; McCulloch, 1989.
In defence of narrow content: Fodor, 1980, 1987, 1991; Blackburn, 1984, ch.9;
Block, 1986; Noonan, 1986, 1993; Segal, 1989a, 1989b, 1991.
160 Content for psychology