intentional properties, nor even a set ofsuYcientconditions for intentional
content, but rather a set ofnecessaryconditions. These would provide
constraints on what it takes to be a creature with intentional contents in
general, and on what is required to entertain any given contentPin
particular. And of course there is plenty of scope, too, for interdisciplinary
work with psychologists, in seeking accounts of the necessary conditions
for a given body of psychological generalisations to have application, such
as were discussed in section 4.4 above in connection with the concept of
belief.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explored the strengths and weaknesses of three
diVerent naturalisation programmes in semantics, arguing that, of the
three, some form of functional-role semantics stands the best chance of
success. But we have also argued that the reductive pretensions of these
programmes are misguided, especially when undertaken as aphilosophical
exercise. Although it may be a requirement on the natural status of
intentional properties that the content-involving laws of scientiWc psychol-
ogy should be explicable in the light of realising mechanisms, such expla-
nations are for natural scientists to discovera posteriori. Philosophers
should, at best, propose and defend some necessary conditions for crea-
tures to entertain intentional contents.
selected reading
On informational semantics: Dretske, 1981, 1986; Fodor, 1987, 1990; Loewer and
Rey, 1991.
On teleo-semantics: Millikan, 1984, 1986, 1989; Papineau, 1987, 1993; Dretske,
1988.
On functional-role semantics: Loar, 1981, 1982; McGinn, 1982; Block, 1986;
Peacocke, 1986, 1992.
On naturalisation: Fodor, 1974; Smith, 1992; Stich, 1992; Tye, 1992.
On concepts in philosophy and in psychology: Margolis and Laurence, 1999. (See
especially the long introductory essay by the editors.)
190 Content naturalised