operates by pattern-matching? We would no longer seriously suppose that
Superparrybelieveswhat it says, or that its words are expressive ofthought.
It is important to distinguish this example from that of theintelligent
robot, however, if any realist conclusions are to be drawn. For if we
withhold mentality from Superparry, not because it operates as a look-up
table, but merely because it is acomputer, then obviously nothing would
follow about the realistic commitments of folk psychology. So, imagine
that robots can be constructed which not only mimic human behaviours,
but which share with us much of their inner architectures and modes of
processing as well. Our view is that such a system should count as a
thinker; and we believe that this intuition is shared by most of the folk.
Admittedly, many people also have the intuition that a robot could
never bephenomenally conscious, or be subject to conscious feelings,
experiences or sensations. But few would deny that a robot could ever have
beliefs, perceptions, and goals. Thus the androids in scienceWction stories,
like the television seriesStar Trek, are standardly represented as being
genuinelythoughtful, but as only simulating (that is, not really possessing)
feelings. We shall return to the alleged mysteriousness of phenomenal
consciousness in chapter 9, arguing that on this matter the folk have been
misled. But for present purposes it is enough that people do not appear to
be committed to the idea that genuine thought requires its possessor to
have a biological constitution. In which case our point that people would
withhold mentality whenever they discover that a computer operates by
pattern-matching really does reveal something of their realistic commit-
ments – only a system with the right sort ofinner organisationcan count as
a thinker; or so we folk-psychologists believe.
3.2 Paralysis and other ailmentsWe are inclined to deny mentality where we know or suspect that inner
organisation is very signiWcantly diVerent from the cases to which we
standardly apply folk psychology (that is, human beings – although it
seems very likely that many non-human animals should also have appro−
priate inner organisation). If that is so, then it would seem that folk
psychology must be committed to certain sorts of mental structuring, at
least in functional terms. But a similar point can be made, we believe, by
considering the readiness of the folk to countenance mentality in the
absenceof behaviour.
Consider someone who is paralysed, and has been so throughout his
lifetime. Or consider someone with severe cerebral palsy, who has only
minimal control of her movements. The folk are nevertheless quite pre-
pared to entertain the idea that such people may be subjects of a rich
The case for realism about folk psychology 33