3 Modularity and nativism
In this chapter we consider how the human mind develops, and the general
structure of its organisation. There has been a great deal of fruitful
research in this area, but there is much more yet to be done. A fully detailed
survey is far beyond the scope of a short book, let alone a single chapter.
But one can set out and defend certain guiding principles or research
programmes. We will be emphasising the importance ofnativismand
modularity.
We use the term ‘nativism’ to signify a thesis about the innateness of
human cognition which does justice to the extent to which it is genetically
pre-conWgured, while being consistent with the way in which psychological
development actually proceeds. In terms of structure, we maintain that the
human mind is organised into hierarchies of sub-systems, ormodules. The
chief advocate of the modularity of mind has been Fodor (1983), but our
version of the modularity thesis is somewhat diVerent from his. In one
respect it is more extreme because we do not restrict the thesis of
modularity to input systems, as Fodor does. But on the other hand, we
think one needs to be a little more relaxed about the degree to which
individual modules are isolated from the functioning of the rest of the
mind.
The point of these disputes about the nature of modularity should
become clearer as we go on. It ought to be stressed, however, that we think
of modules as a natural kind – as a natural kind of cognitive processor, that
is – and so what modulesareis primarily a matter for empirical discovery,
rather than deWnitional stipulation. When one hopes that articulation of a
theory will latch on to the nature of a kind, theorising starts with an
inevitably somewhat cloudy idea and then shapes it in response to growing
empirical knowledge. For the time being, perhaps it will suYce to say that
what we mean by amoduleis a causally integrated processing system with
distinctive kinds of inputs and outputs – a sort of autonomous, or semi-
autonomous, department of the mind.
49