- 1 Introduction: some background Acknowledgements xii
- 1 Developments in philosophy of mind
- 2 Developments in psychology
- 3 Conclusion
- 2 Folk-psychological commitments
- 1 Realisms and anti-realisms
- 2 Two varieties of anti-realism
- 3 The case for realism about folk psychology
- 4 Realism and eliminativism
- 5 Using folk psychology
- 6 Conclusion
- 3 Modularity and nativism
- 1 Some background on empiricism and nativism
- 2 The case for nativism
- 3 Developmental rigidity and modularity
- 4 Fodorian modularity
- 5 Input systems versus central systems
- 6 Conclusion
- 4 Mind-reading
- 1 The alternatives: theory-theory versus simulation
- 2 Problems for simulationism
- 3 A hybrid view
- 4 Developmental studies
- 5 Accounting for autistic impairments
- 6 Conclusion
- 5 Reasoning and irrationality
- 1 Introduction: the fragmentation of rationality
- 2 Some psychological evidence
- 3 Philosophical arguments in defence of rationality
- 4 Psychological explanations of performance
- 5 Practical rationality
- 6 Conclusion
- 6 Content for psychology
- 1 Introduction: wide versus narrow
- 2 Arguments for wide content
- 3 The coherence of narrow content
- 4 Explanation and causation
- 5 Folk-psychological content
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Content naturalised
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Informational semantics
- 3 Teleo-semantics
- 4 Functional-role semantics
- 5 Naturalisation versus reduction
- 6 Conclusion
- 8 Forms of representation
- 1 Preliminaries: thinking in images
- 2 Mentalese versus connectionism
- 3 The place of natural language in thought
- 4 Conclusion
- 9 Consciousness: theWnal frontier?
- 1 Preliminaries: distinctions and data
- 2 Mysterianism
- 3 Cognitivist theories
- 4 Conclusion
- References
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
elliott
(Elliott)
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