Influence

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to be strongly opposed to the proposals were voting for them. Close
examination by political scientists has found the cause to be not so
much Johnson’s political savvy as the large score of favors he had
been able to provide to other legislators during his many years of
power in the House and Senate. As President, he was able to produce
a truly remarkable amount of legislation in a short time by calling in
those favors. It is interesting that this same process may account for
the problems Jimmy Carter had in getting his programs through
Congress during his early administration, despite heavy Democratic
majorities in both House and Senate. Carter came to the presidency
from outside the Capitol Hill establishment. He campaigned on his
outside-Washington identity, saying that he was indebted to no one
there. Much of his legislative difficulty upon arriving may be traced
to the fact that no one there was indebted to him.


  • At another level, we can see the recognized strength of the reciprocity
    rule in the desire of corporations and individuals to provide judicial
    and legislative officials with gifts and favors, and in the series of
    legal restrictions against such gifts and favors. Even with legitimate
    political contributions, the stockpiling of obligations often underlies
    the stated purpose of supporting a favorite candidate. One look at
    the lists of companies and organizations that contribute to the cam-
    paigns of both major candidates in important elections gives evidence
    of such motives. A skeptic, requiring direct evidence of the quid pro
    quo expected by political contributors, might look to the remarkably
    bald-faced admission by Charles H. Keating, Jr., who was later con-
    victed on multiple counts of fraud in this country’s savings and loan
    disaster. Addressing the question of whether a connection existed
    between the $1.3 million he had contributed to the campaigns of five
    U.S. senators and their subsequent actions in his behalf against federal
    regulators, he asserted, “I want to say in the most forceful way I can:
    I certainly hope so.”

  • At the grass-roots level, local political organizations have learned
    that the principal way to keep their candidates in office is to make
    sure they provide a wide range of little favors to the voters. The “ward
    heelers” of many cities still operate effectively in this fashion. But
    ordinary citizens are not alone in trading political support for small
    personal favors. During the 1992 presidential primary campaign,
    actress Sally Kellerman was asked why she was lending her name
    and efforts to the candidacy of Democratic hopeful Jerry Brown. Her
    reply: “Twenty years ago, I asked ten friends to help me move. He
    was the only one who showed up.”


Of course, the power of reciprocity can be found in the merchandising

Robert B. Cialdini Ph.D / 19
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