farther and farther away from reality and thus lower and lower in his own estimation; the way in which the betrayal
of his autonomy and thus of his self-esteem inevitably strengthened his craving for social metaphysical
"approval"—so that his problem became, in effect, self-perpetuating. He has to be led to understand that his
defiantly unthinking attempt at "independence," by means of his infidelities, represents not authentic, healthy self-
assertiveness but only another form of capitulation and self-surrender: his thoughts, his values, were not involved;
he had nothing of his own to express or to seek; he was not acting for himself but only against others, the
omnipresent others whom he sees no way to escape; he is still a "stranger and afraid in a world [he] never made."
This leads us to the question: Is a patient's understanding of the nature and origins of his problems all that is
required to produce a cure? The answer is: No, it is not all that is required; it is essential, but it is only a first step.
The patient's basic disorder was caused by his failure to perform a certain category of mental action: that of
independent thought, judgment, evaluation in regard to himself, his life, and the world around him; the failure to
direct his mind to the task of understanding the facts of reality. The action on which he defaulted is psycho-
epistemological, and the result is his lack of self-esteem and his social-metaphysical dependency. Until and unless
that default is corrected in action (meaning: until and unless he learns to use his mind properly and to be guided by
it in his behavior), his problem cannot be dealt with effectively and eliminated. This requires the slow, laborious,
painful, halting, doubt-ridden process of learning to look at reality through his own eyes, to judge the things he
sees, to draw his own conclusions as honestly and rationally as he is able—and to act accordingly. This is the only
way he can acquire the self-esteem he lacks.
While not all neurotics are social metaphysicians, the therapist will find that the majority of his patients are, to
some extent—and that to guide such patients to intellectual autonomy is one of the most challenging, difficult, and
complex tasks of psychotherapy. I will mention only two of the commonest problems the therapist may expect to
encounter, because they illuminate the kind of psycho-epistemological retraining that is necessary.