account of his behavior. If the behaviorist is unequal to the task of formulating scientific epistemological principles
for the use of introspection and for the integration of introspective data with psychological data obtained by other
means, he is not justified in seeking to reduce an entire field to the level of his inadequacy. Arbitrarily to define the
nature of conscious organisms in such a way as to justify one's preferred method of study, is subjectivism.
Behaviorists frequently attempt to defend their position by means of an epistemological confusion which they did
not originate, but which is very common today among psychologists and philosophers: the argument that since
states of consciousness are "private," and since, therefore, they are not "publicly observable," they cannot be the
subject of objective, scientific knowledge.
Phenomena of consciousness are "private," in the sense indicated earlier, namely, that the only consciousness a
man can experience directly is his own. But, as was also indicated, the inferences a psychologist makes, on the
basis of his introspection, concerning the nature and functions of consciousness, may be checked by his fellow
workers, who also have recourse to introspection—just as one scientist checks on the reported findings of another
by repeating the other's experiment in his own laboratory. If psychologists sometimes disagree about what they
perceive, or about the correct interpretation of what they perceive, this is true of physical scientists also. And the
method of resolving such differences is, in principle, the same: to investigate further, to compare data more
carefully, to define terms more precisely, to explore other, possibly relevant facts, to check their conclusions in the
light of the rest of their knowledge, to search for contradictions or non sequiturs in their reports.
The objectivity of one's conclusions depends, not on whether they are derived from "publicly observable" data, but
on (a) whether they are true (i.e., consonant with the facts of reality), and on (b) the rationality of one's method of
arriving at them. Conclusions arrived at by a rational method can be confirmed by other men and are, in this sense,
"publicly verifiable." But the objective and the publicly observable (or verifiable) are not synonymous.
Whatever men may learn from one another, each man, epistemologically, is alone; knowing is not a social process.
If one man's