obviously influences the strength of the impulse to action as well as, sometimes, the nature of the action taken.
An action tendency, as an emotional experience, can be distinguished from the wider emotional field in which it
occurs. Considered as a separate experience, it is the emotion of desire or of aversion.
Every emotion proceeds from a value-judgment, but not every value-judgment leads to an emotion. An emotion is
experienced only when the value-judgment is considered, by the person involved, to have significance for his own
life, to have relevance to his actions.
Suppose, for example, that a research scientist reads about some new discovery in a field remote from his own,
unconnected to his professional or personal interests and having no implications for his own actions or goals. He
may appraise the discovery as "good," but the appraisal would not invoke any significant or discernible emotion in
him.
Now suppose that he sees in the discovery a possible lead to the solution of a research problem of his own—then
his appraisal of "good" is accompanied by an emotion, a sense of excitement and an eagerness to pursue the lead.
If he sees in the discovery an unmistakable and major key to the solution of his own problem—then the emotion of
elation is more intense and so is the urgency of his desire to rush to his laboratory.
Now consider a different kind of example. A man is in love with a woman and feels sexual desire for her. Then
some physical accident renders him impotent. He does not lose the capacity to experience sexual desire, but that
desire now has a significantly different emotional quality—because the alteration in his own physical state has
affected the action implications of his evaluation of the woman. The estimate of her value as such has not changed;
what has changed is its relevance to himself, to his own actions.
In order to feel love for some object, be it a human being, a pet, or a new house, a man must see some possibility of
action he can take in regard to it; otherwise, his appraisal of "good" is merely an abstract judgment, without
personal significance.
The same principle is clearly evident in the case of the emotion of fear. When, in response to the perception of
some danger to his values, a person feels fear—he feels it on the premise that