Bioterrorism, protective measures WORLD OF MICROBIOLOGY AND IMMUNOLOGY
78
•
the limitations of full-scale military operations become
apparent.
Many scientists and physicians argue that the most
extreme of potential military responses, the formal resumption
of biological weapons programs—even with a limited goal of
enhancing understanding of potential biological agents and
weapons delivery mechanisms—is unneeded and possibly
detrimental to the development of effective protective meas-
ures. Not only would such a resumption be a violation of the
Biological Weapons Conventionto which the United States is
a signatory and which prohibits such research, opponents of
such a resumption argue any such renewal of research on bio-
logical weapons will divert critical resources, obscure needed
research, and spark a new global biological arms race.
Most scientific bodies, including the National Institutes
of Health, Centers for Disease Controland Prevention, advo-
cate a balanced scientific and medical response to the need to
develop protective measures against biological attack. Such
plans allow for the maximum flexibility in terms of effective
response to a number of disease causing pathogens.
In addition to increased research, preparedness pro-
grams are designed to allow a rapid response to the terrorist
use of biological weapons. One such program, the National
Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program (NPS) provides for a ready
supply of antibiotics, vaccines, and other medical treatment
countermeasures. The NPS stockpile is designed to be rapidly
deployable to target areas. For example, in response to poten-
tial exposures to the Bacillus anthracis(the bacteria that
causes anthrax) during the 2001 terrorist attacks, the United
States government and some state agencies supplied Cipro, the
antibiotic treatment of choice, to those potentially exposed to
the bacterium. In addition to increasing funding for the NPS,
additional funds have already been authorized to increase
funding to train medical personnel in the early identification
and treatment of disease caused by the most likely pathogens.
Despite this increased commitment to preparedness,
medical exerts express near unanimity in doubting whether
any series of programs or protocols can adequately provide
comprehensive and effective protection to biological terror-
ism. Nonethless, advocates of increased research capabilities
argue that laboratory and hospital facilities must be expanded
and improved to provide maximum scientific flexibility in the
identification and response to biogenic threats. For example,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), based
in Atlanta, Georgia, has established a bioterrorism response
program that includes increased testing and treatment capac-
Bioterrorist attack on the U.S. Capitol Building in 2001.
womi_B 5/6/03 1:10 PM Page 78