Dollinger index

(Kiana) #1

554 ENTREPRENEURSHIP


Growth (New York: John Wiley, 1986): 231-
33.


  1. In addition to the books mentioned in notes
    5 and 6, see B. Mavrovitis, Cashflow, Credit
    and Collection(Chicago: Probus, 1990); L.
    Masonson, Cash, Cash, Cash (New York:
    Harper, 1990); B. Blechman and J. Levinson,
    Guerrilla Financing (New York: Houghton-
    Mifflin, 1991): chapter 5.

  2. A. Bhide, “Bootstrap Finance: The Art of
    Start-Ups,” Harvard Business Review,
    November-December 1992: 110-17.

  3. “What Is Mezzanine Financing?” Retrieved
    from the Web February 27, 2007,
    http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-mezza-
    nine-financing.htm.

  4. J. Fraser, “Capital Steps,” Inc., February
    1996: 42–47.

  5. H. Sapienza and J. Timmons, “Venture
    Capital: The Decade Ahead.” In J. Kasarda
    and D. Sexton (eds.),The State of the Art of
    Entrepreneurship (Boston: PWS-Kent, 1992):
    402-437.

  6. Lee Gomes, “The Angels Are Back and This
    Time They Have a Trade Group,” The Wall
    Street Journal,April 11, 2005: B1.

  7. State laws are known as blue sky laws.
    Federal laws are primarily those of the U.S.
    Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
    that regulates private offerings. It is impera-
    tive that any entrepreneur navigate these
    waters with the aid of experienced legal coun-
    sel.

  8. J. Freear and W. Wetzel, “The Informal Ven-
    ture Capital Market in the 1990s.” In D. Sex-
    ton and J. Kasarda (eds .), The State of the Art
    of Entrepreneurship (Boston: PWS-Kent,
    1992): pp. 462–486; and Wetzel, 1992.

  9. I. Grosbeck, M. Roberts, and H. Stevenson,
    New Business Ventures and the Entrepreneur,
    3rd ed. (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1989).

  10. D. Enrich, “Lessons from a Lender,” The
    Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2006: R6.

  11. W. Bygrave, “Venture Capital Returns in the
    1980s.” In J. Kasarda and D. Sexton, eds.,
    The State of the Art of Entrepreneurship
    (Boston: PWS-Kent, 1992): 438-61.

  12. J. Solomon, “Intelligence Investing,” The
    Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2005: A4.

  13. J. Emory, “The Value of Marketability as Il-
    lustrated in Initial Public Offerings of Com-
    mon Stock,” Business Valuation Review,
    December 1990: 114–16.

  14. See http://www.grameen-info.org/# for


more information about the bank. Retrieved
from the Web February 27, 2007.


  1. Adapted from J. Timmons, New Venture
    Creation, 3rd ed. (Homewood, IL: Irwin,
    1990).

  2. Adapted from A. Mamis, “Can Your Bank Do
    This?” Inc., March, 1996: 29–38.

  3. P. Singer, “Capital Ideas,” The Wall Street
    Journal,May 8, 2006: R6.

  4. Singer, 2006.

  5. L. Berton, “Asset-Backed Loans Aid Cash
    Strapped Entrepreneurs,” The Wall Street
    Journal, November 28, 1989: B2.

  6. In chapter 5, we suggested that unless good
    business reasons suggested otherwise, a valu-
    ation could be calculated at the end of a five-
    year period of projections.

  7. They may also be bargaining over a host of
    other issues. These will be discussed in the
    next chapter.

  8. Of course, historical returns are no indication
    of future returns. This is boilerplate language
    that all who solicit investments must use.
    Statistically the best prediction of future
    returns is past returns, but this may be a mis-
    use of statistics.

  9. The government is paid first (taxes), then
    employees. Creditors are paid next, followed
    by equity investors, first preferred stockhold-
    ers, and finally common stockholders.

  10. Arbitrage occurs when an asset (or business)
    has different prices in different markets. For
    example, for a very short period of time
    (because of the speed of information), a stock
    can be selling for more in Tokyo than in
    London. Why? Because news affecting earn-
    ings (in this case positively) is released in
    Tokyo first due to the time difference. An
    arbitrageur can profit briefly by buying the
    stock in London and selling it in Tokyo.
    Because the price difference will be small and
    the window of opportunity very narrow, only
    very large transactions make sense.

  11. This discussion follows Stevenson et al.,
    1989.

  12. A “pure play” is a firm that is undiversified
    and operates in a single line of business. Be-
    cause most new ventures operate as pure
    plays and very few ongoing larger firms do, it
    is difficult to get comparable capitalization
    rates.

  13. Of course, the actual amount of equity the
    investor will own is subject to negotiation
    and many other variables. These will be dis-

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