w ho w ant to accelerate globalization, and anti-integrationists, w ho
w ant to slow it dow n or modulate it. W ithin each group, there are
those w ho believe in a safety net and those w ho believe people
should be out on their ow n. T hat creates four categories.
He uses the Zapatistas as an example of the anti-integrationist
pro-safety-net position, and R oss Perot as an example of the anti-
integrationist anti-safety-net position, and dismisses them both as
crazy. T hat leaves the tw o “sensible” positions, w hich are
illustrated by Clinton (integrationist pro-safety-net) and Gingrich
(integrationist anti-safety-net).
To test Friedman’s analysis, let’s look at Gingrich. To see if he
represents maximization of free markets and undermining of safety
nets, let’s ask if he opposed the R eagan administration w hen it
carried out the most protectionist policies since the 1930s? Did he
object w hen Lockheed, his favorite cash cow, got big public
subsidies for its merger w ith Martin Marietta? Did he resist the
closing off of American markets to Japan, so our automotive, steel
and semiconductor industries could reconstruct?
As these questions make clear, Gingrich is not an integrationist.
He simply w ants globalization w hen it’s good for the people he’s paid
to represent, and not w hen it isn’t.
W hat about safety nets? If he’s opposed to w elfare dependency,
then he should certainly be opposed to providing federal subsidies to
his constituents. But, in fact, he’s a champion at bringing them home
to his district.
So it’s easy to see that Friedman’s picture is mostly mythology.
T he fact that he can get aw ay w ith it is the only interesting part of
the story. T he same is true of his belief that globalization is like a
law of nature.
For one thing, in terms of gross measures like trade and
investment flow (relative to the economy), globalization is more or
less just getting back to w here it w as early in the century. (T his is
w ell know n and has been pointed out in quite mainstream circles.)
T here are also new factors. Capital flow s are extremely fast and
huge in scale. T hat’s the result of tw o things: the
telecommunications revolution (w hich is largely just another gift of
publicly developed technology to private businesses), and the
decision, during the Nixon administration, to break dow n the Bretton
Woods system. But there’s nothing inevitable about either—
especially not the particular forms they’ve taken.
ann
(Ann)
#1