Getting free from the colonial pow ers generated a tremendous burst
of energy in India, as did presenting a neutralist challenge to U S
domination.
T hat challenge is pretty much gone—from Indian policy, at least,
if not from the general population.
T he U S w as very much opposed to Indian independence and also,
of course, to Nehru’s attempts at nonalignment. Any Indian w ith a
streak of independence w as bitterly hated and condemned by U S
policymakers. Eisenhow er called Nehru a “schizophrenic” w ho
suffered from an “inferiority complex” and had a “terrible
resentment [of] domination by w hites” (really surprising, given how
the British treated India).
T he U S basically brought the Cold War to South Asia by arming
Pakistan, w hich w as part of our system of control of the Middle
East. It ended up w ith India and Pakistan fighting several w ars w ith
each other, sometimes w ith American arms.
U S policymakers w ere also w orried about Indonesia. In 1948,
George Kennan, one of the chief architects of U S policy, described
Indonesia as “the most crucial issue of the moment in our struggle
w ith the Kremlin.” (T he U SSR w asn’t really the issue, of course—
that w as just code for “independent T hird W orld development.”)
He w as very much afraid that a Communist Indonesia w ould be an
“infection [that] “w ould sw eep w estw ard through all of South
Asia”—not by conquest, of course, but by example. T hat concern
w asn’t really overcome until the mass slaughter in Indonesia in
1965, w hich the U S government, the press and other commentators
w ere all exhilarated about.
T hey had the same fear about China—not that it w as going to
conquer South Asia, but that it w as developing in w ays that might be
a model for other Asian countries. U S policymakers remained
ambivalent tow ard India. T hey had to support it as an alternative
model to China, but they hated to do it, because India w as follow ing a
somew hat independent line and had established close relations w ith
the Soviet U nion.
T he U S gave some aid to India, w hich w as supposed to be the
democratic alternative to China. But it w as given grudgingly, and the
U S w ouldn’t permit India to develop its ow n energy resources;
instead, they had to import oil, w hich w as much more expensive.
India’s petroleum resources are apparently significant, but they still