depredations of the powerful.
T he UN was able to respond to Iraq’s aggression because—for
once—the United States allowed it to. T he unprecedented severity
of the UN sanctions was the result of intense US pressure and
threats. T he sanctions had an unusually good chance of working,
both because of their harshness and because the usual sanctions-
busters—the United States, Britain and France—would have abided
by them for a change.
But even after allowing sanctions, the US immediately moved to
close off the diplomatic option by dispatching a huge military force
to the Gulf, joined by Britain and backed by the family dictatorships
that rule the Gulf ’s oil states, with only nominal participation by
others.
A smaller, deterrent force could have been kept in place long
enough for the sanctions to have had a significant effect; an army of
half a million couldn’t. T he purpose of the quick military build-up
was to ward off the danger that Iraq might be forced out of Kuwait
by peaceful means.
W hy was a diplomatic resolution so unattractive? W ithin a few
weeks after the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, the basic outlines
for a possible political settlement were becoming clear. Security
Council Resolution 660, calling for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait,
also called for simultaneous negotiations of border issues. By mid-
August, the National Security Council considered an Iraqi proposal
to withdraw from Kuwait in that context.
T here appear to have been two issues: first, Iraqi access to the
Gulf, which would have entailed a lease or other control over two
uninhabited mudflats assigned to Kuwait by Britain in its imperial
settlement (which had left Iraq virtually landlocked); second,
resolution of a dispute over an oil field that extended two miles into
Kuwait over an unsettled border.
T he US flatly rejected the proposal, or any negotiations. On
August 22, without revealing these facts about the Iraqi initiative
(which it apparently knew), the New York Times reported that the
Bush administration was determined to block the “diplomatic track”
for fear that it might “defuse the crisis” in very much this manner.
(T he basic facts were published a week later by the Long Island
daily Newsday, but the media largely kept their silence.)
T he last known offer before the bombing, released by US
officials on January 2, 1991, called for total Iraqi withdrawal from
ann
(Ann)
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