166 Difference
to suggest any special knowledge that wouldn’t otherwise appear to a
reasonable person, you’re right- the primary focus becomes, what were
the reasonable expectations of the prospective buyer? Now, when you
asked me if that is a subjective standard or not, the answer has to be,
“No, absolutely not,” because reasonable is always objective. Reasonable
is always measured against this reasonable, objective personality, as
distinct from an idiosyncratic, individualized, inside-their-head type of
an approach. I think, what you were probably driving at is, is the more
basic question, “Is this an individualistic determination on a case-by-
case basis?” Absolutely, absolutely. Now, the court said it’s an offer. And
they give some decent reasons for it. I don’t think those reasons are
necessarily totally conclusive. You could make a case on the other side.
Uh, but, I think they did support it with decent reasoning. They said,
“Wait a minute. If this had just been the statement initially, and you
start making it look more like the Kershaw v. Moulton case, it would- it
would particularly fail as an offer then because you would not have a
definite quantity. It would be just like Kershaw v. Moulton in that sense.
They say, ‘We offer you these glass jars at the following prices, per
gross,’ not specifying how many.”[Note elision of voices here, lack of clear
demarcation of when court’s voice ends.] And, we’re going to see that’s
the key, that’s exactly what you have in Kershaw v. Moulton. They offer
you barrels of salt at a particular price. No specification of how many
barrels. (.) But with no designation of quantity, it’s not reasonable to
assume that this person would wish to commit himself. (.) So, we would
say, the first, basic criterion is going to be an offer. That’s going to be
the first of the two-part steps necessary. You’ve got to create that power
of acceptance. And it can’t happen until you get an offer. Now, we’re
going to see ways that that offer can die or be killed. [... omitted
material (6.42 total turn time)... ] Any other questions? (.02 pause)
Okay, the Craft case (.) Now, there is a general rule. A general rule
concerning newspaper advertisements. What is the general rule? (.05
pause) Uh, yes, umm, Ms. R.?Until this final turn, the exchange did not appear to be markedly different from
those found in other, more participatory classes. We see an example of the class
responding as a whole to one question. When one student gives an unsatisfactory
reply, the professor cautions him gently—interestingly, using a metalinguistic cor-
rection of how the student “articulates” the point and paraphrasing the student’s
answer. The ubiquity of forms of reported speech in law professors’ talk (see Chapter
6) is evident in this excerpt, as the professor reports first indirectly and then di-
rectly what the court said, as well as rephrasing the student’s question and answer-
ing in a direct quotation (“the answer has to be, ‘No, absolutely not’”)—an
interesting reframing of what is essentially the professor’s own speech as the prod-
uct of an authoritative, almost external voice stating the inevitable. In the professor’s
direct quotation of the court’s speech, there is an intriguing blurring of the bound-
aries between the court’s voice and that of the professor explicating the court’s
reasoning. From a very clear initial boundary (“The court said, ‘Now wait a minute
... ’”), the quotation devolves into murky territory, until at last with the sentence
“And, we’re going to see... ,” the professor has clearly moved back into his own