See Cutler, “Inadequate Law School Training”; David, “The Clinical Lawyer-
School”; Devitt, “Why Don’t Law Schools Teach Law Students How to Try Lawsuits?”
See, e.g., Baker, “Transcending the Legacies of Literacy”; Burton, “Cultivating
Ethical”; Calleros, “Training a Diverse Student Body”; Cunningham, “Lawyer as Transla-
tor”; Stanchi, “Resistance Is Futile.” In recent years, there have been interesting attempts
to bridge divisions among traditional law teaching, clinical approaches, and social science
as part of a movement toward a “new legal realism.” See Conley, “How Bad Is It”; Trubek,
“Crossing Boundaries.”
Stone, “Legal Education on the Couch.”
Id., 412–428. On law student distress and alienation, see,.e.g., Carrington and
Conley, “The Alienation of Law Students”; Benjamin et al., “The Role of Legal Education”;
Glenn, “Some Thoughts.” J. M. Mitchell, taking a different approach, drew on cognitive
and developmental theories of expert and novice thinking to develop a list of suggested
improvements on the traditional teaching methodology. J. Mitchell, “Current Theories on
Expert and Novice Thinking.” For one updated resource on alternative teaching methods
in law, see Torres and Lundwall, “Moving beyond Langdell II.” As noted earlier, the cur-
rent literature is replete with suggested innovations and novel applications of psychology
or sociology to legal education, particularly in the areas of clinical teaching and legal writ-
ing. Unfortunately, a status gap between these fields and that of other law professors means
that the latter are unlikely to value or read (and thus learn from) their colleagues’ often
better informed understandings of pedagogical innovations.
See, e.g., Boyle, “Employing Active-Learning Techniques”; Jacobson, “A Primer
on Learning Styles”; Richmond, “Teaching Law to Passive Learners”; Randall, “The Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator”; Ripps, “A Curriculum Course.”
See Daicoff, “Lawyer Know Thyself,” for a comprehensive review of the litera-
ture dealing with the lawyer and law student personality and other attributes. Daicoff draws
on empirical research to document an overall shift during law school away from interest
in people, emotions, interpersonal matters, and altruism, and a concomitant shift toward
emphasis on logic, rationality, rights, rules, authoritarianism, achievement, competitive-
ness, and aggression. In this original article, Daicoff suggests that some of these aspects of
law school training might actually fit well with the overall professional profile found in
successful lawyers, and thus might serve a useful purpose despite appearances to the con-
trary. In her recent book on the same issue, Daicoff adds a new, more hopeful perspec-
tive, arguing that although some of the less attractive aspects of legal education might serve
professional ends, it is important to counterbalance these with training that takes account
of skills and traits often neglected or disfavored in legal education—as a way to mitigate
the negative effects of lawyers’ prototypical approach on public confidence in the profes-
sion, on professional ethics, and on lawyer satisfaction. Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself. For
contrary results on lawyer satisfaction, indicating relatively positive satisfaction levels
among lawyers in Toronto, Chicago, and Minnesota, see Hagan and Kay, Gender in Prac-
tice; Heinz et al., “Lawyers”; Mattessich and Heilman, “The Career Paths.”
Banks, “Gender Bias in the Classroom” and “Gender Bias in the Classroom (2)”;
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen.
See, e.g, Areeda, “The Socratic Method”; Harno, Legal Education; Konop, “The
Case System”; Louiseaux, “The Newcomer”; Morgan, “The Case Method”; Vitiello, “Pro-
fessor Kingsfield.”
