Descartes: A Biography

c CUNYB/Clarke     December, :

 Descartes: A Biography

supported by reference to the unpublishedWorld. Such explanations were

radically different from what was widely taught in schools, for, according to

Descartes’ concept of matter, it contained ‘none of those forms or qualities

about which they dispute in the schools’ (vi.).

In the final section of theDiscourse(Part VI), Descartes eventually

addresses one of the fundamental questions raised by his scientific essays,

namely, the extent to which the theories presented there could be con-

firmed by evidence, and the kind of evidence that would be relevant to the

task. The solution he offered was a compromise that was excused by the

provisional status of the publication. In other words, Descartes claimed to

have a fundamental theory of nature inThe Worldthat could ‘demonstrate’

all the theories outlined in thebook. At the same time, he could not

publish that work yet. He therefore had no option, he claimed, but to

begin theDioptricsand theMeteorswith various ‘assumptions’ that, had

The Worldbeen published, could have been established more certainly. He

explained the compromise as follows:

If some of the issues that I have spoken about at the beginning of theDioptricsand the

Meteorsshock people initially, because I call them assumptions and seem not to want

to prove them, they should have the patience to read the whole text attentively....For

it seems to me that the arguments are interconnected in such a way that, just as the

last ones are demonstrated by the first, which are their causes, the first arguments are

demonstrated reciprocally by the last, which are their effects. (vi.)

Descartes knew that this looked like what philosophers had traditionally

called a vicious circle, or usingAto proveBand then usingBto prove

A.However, he claims not to fall into that trap because the relationships

between cause and effect are not equivalent. We know the effects or the

natural phenomena that we are trying to explain, and that knowledge is

used toconfirmthe truth of our theories. Working in the opposite direction,

the theories are not meant to confirm the truth of our descriptions of

phenomena (which we already know), but are designed toexplainthe

phenomena in question. Besides, he adds, ‘I only called them assumptions

to let it be known that I think I can deduce them from those first truths

that I have explained above’ (vi.), but that have not yet been revealed

to the public.

This attempt at revelation and concealment, with some self-justifying

comments on method, failed miserably. One of the reasons was that the

Discoursecontained enough hints about the general theory proposed in