UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS BETWEEN CLAIMS 51
the sweeping generalisation. Often people will make a conclusion that is far too
general, or definitive for the reasons they are presenting to support it. An example
would be: Australia has a good education system with strong programs to teach
literacy, and thus all Australians know how to read and write.' It is true that
Australia has a good education system with such programs but it is not true,
consequentially, that all Australians know how to read and write. First, some
Australians have learning difficulties or other impairments that prevent them from
benefiting from those programs; a few Australians—usually those from dis-
advantaged backgrounds—face problems in attending school, being able to
function effectively there, and so on that again vitiate the impact of those programs.
But, logically, the mistake made here is that the scope and certainty of the con-
clusion is not in step with the scope and certainty of the premise. Therefore when
making the link between premises and conclusion, we need to align the scope and
certainty so that one can support the other. A better argument would be: Australia
has a good education system with strong programs to teach literacy, and thus it is
very likely that Australians will leave school knowing how to read and write'. The
change is in the claim that serves as the conclusion: but the consequence of the
change is in fact to strengthen the link between the claims.
Thinking about values
I argued above that Australia is a good country in which to live', a claim that is
obviously making a value judgment. Let us assume, for a moment, that my initial
thought as to why this claim is true was Australia permits freedom of religious
expression'. The mistake here of just having one premise is compounded by the fact
that this premise does not make an explicit value judgment and thus suggests
something is very wrong with my thinking. Returning to the example above, we
can see that part of the job done by the claim 'Countries that permit freedom of
religious expression are good places to live' is to place in the premises a claim that,
like the conclusion, also asserts a value judgment.
Here is another example concerning value judgments:- Ian will be imprisoned.
- Ian has been convicted of defrauding Michael.
- The penalty for someone convicted of fraud is imprisonment.
In this analytical structure, the conclusion does not make a value judgment—it does
not explicitly state that Ian should or should not be imprisoned. It simply predicts the
future based on the premises given. But imagine the argument is concluding 'It is right
that Ian should be imprisoned': the premises 2 and 3 do not, in this case, support the
conclusion because there is no value judgment there. We would have to add a premise
such as 'The penalty of imprisonment for the crime of fraud is a good penalty' to make
the structure logical. Of course, the value of being accurate like this is to expose the need
for an argument to support this added premise. While it is probably not necessary, in
most everyday arguments, to prove Ian's conviction, or that the penalty is imprisonment