MORE EFFECTIVE REASONING II: BETTER LINKS 83
either implicitly or explicitly. For example, to support the conclusion that 'The
problem of unemployment in a late capitalist economy demands government
regulation of the labour market' carries with it a similar range of issues as the last
example. Yet it also concerns further issues regarding the values implicit in the
claim. Is unemployment necessarily a problem? It would not be implausible to
imagine that some people would favour higher unemployment (as, for example, a
way of keeping wage costs down). The trick is to be aware of the connotations of
our conclusions—those less obvious meanings and implications, which even
though they are not explicit in the stated claim, nevertheless require explanation or
argument. Such an awareness is the hallmark of effective reasoning. Once again, it
is the context (audience, general expectations, and so on) that makes clear what
connotations we might need to consider. Arguments about Aboriginal-European
relations, for example, now occur in a context that is completely different to that
of thirty years ago, precisely because general knowledge among Australians about
this issue has changed and the attitudes towards Aboriginal people among white
Australians are somewhat more positive than in the 1970s.
Breadth of premises
It is rare to find a claim that is so simple in what it asserts about the world that it
can be easily supported by one or two premises; what is more, when explaining why
an event has occurred, the reasons on which our explanation are based are likely to
be highly complex. Hence, as well as giving depth to each individual reason
(expressed as a chain of premises), we also need to give a broad argument when
required. Such breadth ensures that reasoning is not rendered ineffective by
oversimplification. There is, of course, no general rule regarding how much
information should be given in support of a conclusion: it depends on the con-
clusion and the context. No reason should be given that is irrelevant to the con-
clusion. Yet we should not exclude relevant information; otherwise we will not deal
with the full complexity of an issue.
The need for breadth is particularly evident in reasoning about why things have
happened or why they might in future happen (cause and effect). For example, if
we were to argue that Australia's current rate of immigration is too low', we could
develop a series of arguments about the effects of low immigration, drawing on
various aspects of this topic. Without at the moment unpacking them into
complete premises, there are at least four different 'reasons':
a A larger population provides significant economic benefits.
b Higher immigration provides significant cultural benefits.
c Higher immigration is a sign to the rest of the world that Australia is
a good international citizen,
d Higher immigration will increase Australia's defence capabilities.
Each reason concerns a different aspect of the problem—a different point that,
independently, supports the conclusion. Why would a collection of reasons be