54 Europe The Economist October 9th 2021
Biggerisstillbetter
F
lanked by the leaders of Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina,
Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president,
hailed the opening of the Svilaj bridge, linking the two countries.
It was part of her tour of the western Balkan region, a term used by
the eu to define the Balkan countries that have not yet joined the
club and which have sat waiting on the doorstep since being
promised eventual membership back in 2003. The happy integra
tion between the euand its Balkan neighbours was cast as nothing
less than inevitable. “All the western Balkans belong in the Euro
pean Union,” said Mrs von der Leyen. “It’s in our common interest,
but I also believe it’s our destiny.”
Kind words collided with reality a week later. At a summit in
Slovenia on October 6th of all 27 euleaders and their six counter
parts from Albania, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro,
North Macedonia and Serbia, the prospect of new countries join
ing the euany time soon was absent. Instead, the western Balkan
countries emerged with a pledge to cut roaming fees when their
citizens visit the eu. An attempt by Slovenia to guarantee their
membership by the end of the decade was dismissed as an outra
geous publicity stunt. Literal bridge building was not accompa
nied by the metaphorical kind.
Enlargement of the euis, bluntly, dead. Across the western Bal
kans, governments are hurt. North Macedonia may have dutifully
jumped through every hoop required to begin accession talks, in
cluding changing its name to settle a dispute with Greece. Yet an
arcane row about the origins of the Macedonian language led to
Bulgaria vetoing the start of negotiations. Albania, whose applica
tion is linked to North Macedonia’s in a futile attempt to stop such
political gamesmanship, is also stuck. Its prime minister com
pared its relationship with the euto a failing marriage. Normally,
there is at least a wedding first. The euwants to be a global force,
but it is in danger of losing control of its own backyard.
A realistic prospect of joining the euis the bloc’s main tool for
dealing with its neighbours. Yet at the moment, all sides know it is
a fantasy. Countries such as France are deeply sceptical, preferring
a deeper euto a wider one. Diplomats from other cautious coun
tries such as Denmark and the Netherlands insist their govern
ments are fine with the idea of enlargement, as long as stringentcriteria are met. Domestic politicians are, however, not always so
nuanced. There is no chance of new countries joining the eu, even
while the club’s leadership says otherwise.
This is a problem. If incentives for good behaviour disappear,
so do disincentives for bad behaviour. Tantrums in the western
Balkans are now common, in the knowledge there is little to be
lost. Why bother taking on vested interests or reforming the judi
cial system for naught? Those with little to lose have least to fear.
Hence a row over number plates between Serbia and Kosovo led to
special forces being deployed at the border. In the western Bal
kans, damned foolish things happen increasingly often.
Sceptics insist that the club cannot digest new members. For
mer posterchildren of euenlargement, such as Poland, have be
come problem children. An euwithout Poland or Hungary would
spend less time worrying about nobbled judges or dodgy use of
funds within the club. It is easy to find diplomats who think en
largement was a mistake. But this counterfactual is one that leaves
the euwith an even more troublesome frontier. If the eu’s eastern
members had remained outside the club, they might have fol
lowed the trajectories of other countries beyond the eububble,
such as Ukraine. Exclusion is no happy solution.
A sense of perspective comes from across the Atlantic. Ameri
can diplomats remind their more sceptical European counter
parts that life would be much easier with the western Balkans
firmly inside the European tent, rather than outside getting wet,
with other countries offering shelter. Montenegro has already got
itself into trouble with a $1bn loan from China. Serbia has become
a canny diplomat, accepting vaccines from everywhere and then
distributing them to neighbours. Emmanuel Macron, the French
president, sees Bosnia as a font of Islamist instability. In short, it is
not a region that the eucan afford to lose.
Instead, a dangerous complacency lurks among eugovern
ments. The eu has dished out vaccines. It accounts for almost 70%
of trade in the region. It invests about €3bn ($3.5bn) a year, which
is a fair sum for a poor region of 20m people. Whatever Russia and
China can offer, the eucan more than match, runs the logic.
Threats of a geopolitical switch are brushed off by euofficials as
diplomatic bravado by their Balkan peers. Size does matter
Attention thus drifts elsewhere. Leaders would rather focus on the
other side of the world, instead of the eu’s chaotic courtyard. On
the eve of the Slovenian summit, leaders discussed the club’s
strategy in the Pacific, which is a far sexier topic for those who
dream of European might. The idea of spending hours discussing
Kosovan number plates or the etymology of Macedonian words
makes the eyes of European leaders roll into the back of their
heads. In the Pacific leaders see history being made. In the Balkans
they see history being repeated—to the point of tedium.
Yet it is the western Balkans that is the more pressing test of the
eu’s foreignpolicy capability, rather than seemingly larger and
more global topics. A coherent common policy on North Macedo
nia, Albania and their neighbours should be simple, compared
with more difficult choices that lie ahead for the eu. At the mo
ment, the eu’s China policy designates the country as partner,
competitor and rival. Eventually it will have to pick, deciding what
is in its collective interest. So the club may be better advised to be
gin with what should be the easierchoices. If the euwants to be a
global power, it needs to becomea localone first. A revived en
largement policy is the place to start.nCharlemagne
The European Union should not give up on enlargement