naval power, but he needed access to either the Baltic or the
Crimean Sea, preferably both. The Swedes blocked his way in the
north and the Turks, in the south.
x At the time of Charles’s invasion, Peter had begun his
modernization of the Russian army, probably most successful in
the area of upgrading the army’s gunpowder weapons, from the
common soldier’s musket up to heavy siege cannons. The Russian
army was especially well-equipped with a large number of modern
artillery pieces.
The Campaign
x Peter adopted a strategy emulated during later invasions of Russia
by Napoleon and Hitler. His army retreated before the advancing
Swedes and enacted a policy of destroying farms, burning crops,
and forcing the invaders to maintain long supply lines. Peter was
also counting on one of Russia’s most potent defensive strengths:
its long, terrible winters.
x Peter’s other secret weapon was the vast size of Russia: He could
afford to surrender huge chunks of territory, luring the Swedes
farther from home, reinforcements, and supplies.
x The Swedish army crossed the Vistula River in December 1707
and steadily progressed across Poland and into Lithuania before
halting for the winter in February. The army moved forward again
in June, and there were several skirmishes and minor battles with
the Russians. Peter and his main army shadowed the Swedes but
would not commit to a decisive battle, thus drawing Charles deeper
into Russia.
x The supply question was becoming critical, and Charles’s best bet
seemed to be to turn south toward the Ukraine, although this would
divert his march away from Moscow. When some Ukraine-based
Cossack groups rebelled against Peter and offered to join Charles,
also offering to feed his starving army, his decision to turn south
was reinforced.