34 Europe TheEconomistOctober9th 2021
would still be easier to transit the Bospo
rus, even on a bad weather day,” he says.
Some doubt the project will ever get off
the ground. Insiders say the ceremony in
June was a stunt, and that the construction
of a bridge over the Sazlidere was part of an
unrelated road project. The logistical ob
stacles are immense. To make room for the
canal, the government would have to re
configure Istanbul’s roads, its sewage sys
tem and its power and gas lines, says Mr
Isik. The price tag could easily reach $35bn,
around 5% of the country’s gdp, says a
Turkish banker. Contractors, including
some Chinese and Western companies, are
sniffing around, but most banks want
nothing to do with it.
Environmentalists warn of catastrophe.
The canal could destroy Istanbul’s main
reservoirs, raze much of its remaining for
est and cover yet more land in concrete. It
could also poison the Sea of Marmara. The
canal would allow much more water from
the Black Sea, which is less salty and
packed with organic compounds, to gush
into the Marmara, depleting its oxygen and
killing much of its marine life.
The real point of the canal, critics sus
pect, is to offer construction companies
close to the government new land to devel
op. “This is a realestate project,” says Ek
rem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul, who
is leading a campaign against it. Mr Imam
oglu’s party is in opposition at the national
level and warns that, should it come to
power, it will suspend all work on the ca
nal. But the mayor does not have the au
thority to stop work from going ahead.
Some Turks have bought into the hype.
At his office a short walk from where the
canal would meet the Black Sea, Hakan Bo
lukbasi, an estate agent, is doing a roaring
trade. A square metre of land near the
planned route of the canal now sells for
1,000 lira ($113), he says, up from 50 lira five
years ago. Nearby, the fields brim with sun
flowers, villagers sell watermelons from
tractors and water buffaloes graze. All this
may soon be gone. The area, and much of
the land near the canal, has been ear
marked for new housing. Buyers include
Berat Albayrak, a former finance minister
married to Mr Erdogan’s daughter, and
members of Qatar’s royal family.
The danger is that Mr Erdogan may use
the canal as an excuse to renegotiate, or
even withdraw from, the Montreux Con
vention.Earlier this year, after Mr Erdogan
revoked Turkey’s participation in a con
vention protecting women from violence,
the speaker of parliament remarked that
the president could do the same with Mon
treux. Mr Erdogan said he would abide by it
until a better one comes along. The com
ments provoked an angry response from
Russia, which sees Montreux as a way to
keep Western navies out of the Black Sea.
Without the convention, the Black Sea
wouldturnintoa “powderkeg”,saysCem
Gurdeniz, a retiredadmiral.Earlier this
yearheandseveralotherformerofficers
werebrieflyarrestedoncoupchargesafter
penningan openletterdefendingMon
treuxandcriticisingthecanalproject.The
investigation isongoing.Thecanalmay
onedaytriggera crisisintheBlackSea.But
itwillprovokeapoliticalrowinTurkey
longbeforethat.n
Black Sea
Bosporus
Seaof
Marmara
Bridges
Tunnels
Ataturk
ISTANBUL
Istanbul Airport
Sazlidere
River
KANAL ISTANBUL
PROPOSED ROUTE
Built-up
areas
TURKEY
Ankara
Dardanelles
Strait
20 km
Italy
Rattling the right
F
ormorethantwoyears,thecommon
wisdom has been that Italy’s next gov
ernment will be rightwing—and radically
so. Polls have consistently indicated that
the Brothers of Italy party, with its origins
in neofascism, and the populist Northern
League should together secure enough
seats at the next election to form a parlia
mentary majority, perhaps even without
needing help from Silvio Berlusconi’s
more moderate Forza Italia movement.
But local elections on October 3rd and
4th showed how fragile the support under
pinning the hard right is. Centreleft may
oral candidates won with more than half
the votes in Milan, Naples and Bologna.
Others in Rome and Turin look set to win
in runoffs on October 17th and 18th.
The elections followed a nightmarish
campaign for the League’s leader, Matteo
Salvini, and for the leader of the Brothers—
who is in fact a sister, Giorgia Meloni. On
September 26th it emerged that Mr Salvi
ni’s socialmedia guru, Luca Morisi, was
under formal investigation on suspicion of
supplying narcotics. Mr Morisi denies any
wrongdoing. Four days later, Ms Meloni’s
drive to give her party a moderate, voter
friendly image suffered a grievous blow
when a video was released showing some
of her followers joking about Hitler, giving
fascist salutes and apparently arranging
for the Brothers to receive money illicitly.
An investigation has since been opened in
to a suspected breach of Italy’s law on
funding political parties.
All this comes against a background of
increasing division in the League. Mr Salvi
ni’s position has become sufficiently tenu
ous for him to have spoken openly of being
replaced. “If there is someone better than
me,” he told an interviewer recently. “I’ll
gladly enjoy [spending] a few hours more
with my children.”
The origin of his troubles is his decision
earlier this year that the League should join
Italy’s current government—a broad co
alition headed by the former president of
the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi.
The League’s support for Mr Draghi earned
it three places in the cabinet and a say in
the spending of around €200bn ($230bn)
from the eu’s postpandemic recovery
funds.
But backing a government headed by a
central banker who once defined himself
as a liberal socialist was diametrically at
odds with Mr Salvini’s populist instincts. It
has also offered the Brothers a chance to
steal the League’s populist thunder by re
maining in opposition. Mr Salvini did opt
to stay out of the cabinet, but has cut an
increasingly awkward figure. In his efforts
to hang on to the populist vote, he has re
peatedly sniped at policies that ministers
from his own party have endorsed.
Nowhere has his predicament been
more obvious than in the contrast between
his courting of the antivaccine lobby and
the government’s vaccine mandates. He
originally described the eu’s plans for a
pass for the vaccinated, those who had re
covered from covid19 or been tested in the
previous 48 hours, as “insane crap”. Ignor
ing his objections, Mr Draghi’s government
has since made the pass obligatory for ac
cess to a host of venues and services.
Later this month Italy will become the
first European country to require the pass
for entry to both private and public work
places. Even more embarrassingly for Mr
Salvini, the government’s policies have
been openly backed by the business minis
ter, the League’s Giancarlo Giorgetti, and
its regional governors in the industrial
north—united in a desire to avoid further
economically crippling lockdowns.
The League has been steadily losing
electoral support since mid2019 and now
polls around 20%, down from 30% or so
two years ago. In recent months, and for
the first time, it has been overtaken by the
Brothers. It is not clear whether Ms Mel
oni’s party will be able to shrug off thelat
est allegations and hang on to thatlead.
But Italy’s right looks badly weakened.n
R OME
The Northern League and the Brothers
of Italy both wobble