The Economist October 9th 2021 MiddleEast&Africa 51
FranceandAfrica
Liaisons
douloureuses
A
yearagoAchilleMbembe,a Cameroo
nian postcolonial writer, lambasted
Emmanuel Macron’s Africa policy. Has
France, he wrote, still not “understood
that, far from being transitory, the discred
it into which France has fallen is a structur
al and multigenerational phenomenon
and not the result of the victimisation of a
few excolonised people?”
On October 8th, at a FranceAfrica sum
mit in the French city of Montpellier, none
other than Mr Mbembe will host a discus
sion between the president and a dozen
young people. The 3,000 or so guests, from
Africa and its diaspora in France, will in
clude entrepreneurs, activists, intellectu
als, film directors, scientists and students.
No African government leader is invited.
The official point, says the Elysée, is to
“speed up the changing relationship be
tween France and Africa” which Mr Mac
ron hailed in a speech in Ouagadougou in
- Then, the freshly elected president
told students in Burkina Faso’s capital: “I
am of a generation for whom the crimes of
European colonisation cannot be disput
ed” and “of a generation that doesn’t come
to tell Africans what to do”. It felt like a
symbolic moment that might herald a less
testy and distrustful tie between France
and Africa. The president has since re
turned art to Senegal and Benin, promised
an end to the cfa franc in West Africa and
asked for forgiveness for France’s share of
responsibility for the genocide in Rwanda.
Yet distrust of French policy has if any
thing hardened, as has French frustration
over those suspicions. Mr Macron keeps
5,100 soldiers in the Sahel as part of an
Americanbacked antijihadist mission,
Operation Barkhane. He will wind this
down in northern Mali, closing three mili
tary bases there, and reshape it from a base
in Niger around a European specialforces
unit, Takuba. In August the French scored a
tactical success when a drone strike killed
Adnan Abu Walid alSahrawi, the leader of
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.
Jihadists and terrorists continue to
flourish in the region, however, in areas
beyond the control of states, as does abuse
by government soldiers. Democracy and
the rule of law are being trampled with
abandon from Mali to Guinea. France usu
ally turns a blind eye to coups. But it is los
ing patience. On September 25th Mali’s
prime minister, Choguel Maïga, who was
installed after the second coup in a year,
accusedMrMacronofan“abandoninmid
flight”,andsaidhehadnochoicebutto
turntoothersforsecurity.Hewasrefer
ring,withoutnamingit,toWagner,a Rus
sian mercenary outfit. Florence Parly,
France’sdefence minister, described the
notionthatFrenchsoldierswerequitting
theregionas“scandalous”. Butshe also
warnedMalithata Wagnercontractwould
compromiseitsmilitarypresence.
Amidsuchtensiontheunstatedpur
poseofthesummitisa “needtoclarifythe
wayFranceisquestioned”,saysa presiden
tialaide.Theideaistoleteachsidevoice
grievances,inthehopeofclearingtheairat
a nongovernmentallevel.TheFrenchfeel
thattheyare“reproachedforsilence”,says
theElysée,andwhentheydospeak,“for
interference”.
MrMacronwillhavehisworkcutout,
someofitofhisownmaking.Daysbefore
thesummithedrewAlgerianirebytalking
ofa “politicomilitarysystem”whichhas
“completely rewritten official history”
based on “a hatred of France”. Algeria
closeditsairspacetoFrenchmilitaryair
craft.Francesaysitwillcutthenumberof
visasissuedinAlgeria,MoroccoandTuni
sia unlessthe trio cooperatein taking
backexpelledillegalimmigrants.
ThisweekMali’smilitaryrulersprotest
edwhenMrMacroncriticisedtheabsence
ofgovernmentinpartsoftheircountry.
“Youcouldsayit’sa difficultmomenttobe
airingdifferences,”saysHervéBerville,a
RwandaborndeputyforMrMacron’spar
ty,“oryoucouldsayit’sneverbeenmore
pertinentormoreimportanttodoso.” n
P ARIS
Let’s clear the air, mes amis
EmploymentintheGulf
Spendingtostand still
B
ynowgulfrulershavetriedalmost
everything.For muchofthe region’s
modern history wellpaid government
jobs have beenabirthrightfor citizens.
Thisperkformsthecoreoftheregion’sso
cial contracts: cushy, lucrative employ
ment inexchangeforthedeprivationof
political rights. Worried about growing
populationsanduncertain oilrevenues,
though,Gulfstateshavespentthepasttwo
decadestryingtopersuadeandprodtheir
pampered subjectsto work forprivately
ownedfirms.Ithasbeena realworldex
perimentineconomics—anda largelyun
successfuloneatthat.
InSeptembertheUnitedArabEmirates
(uae) announceditslatestattempt,a pro
grammethatwillcost5bndirhams($1.3bn)
a year(0.3%ofgdp).Atitscorearewage
subsidiesofupto8,000dirhamsa month
forthefirstyearandupto5,000dirhamsa
monthforthenextfiveyears,forcitizens
whotakeprivatejobs.
Likeitsneighbours,theEmiratigovern
mentiskeentotrimitsownworkforce.In
2019, 78% of Emiratis in employment
workedinthepublicsector,eventhough
thesemadeupjust10%ofthecountry’sto
taljobs.Only8%ofcitizensworkedsolely
at private firms. These numbers have
changedlittleovertime:in2008,80%of
Emiratisworkedforthestate.
Thismakessense:governmentstendto
paybetter.Whilefewpublishdetailedsta
tistics,theimfputsthepublictoprivate
wagegapintheGulfat3050%fornation
als.Publicemployeeshaveeasiersched
ules—sevenhoursa dayintheuae, com
paredwitheightatprivatefirms—andbet
terbenefits.ThegovernmentofDubaire
centlygaveemployeesanextrasixdaysof
paidleavetocelebratetheworldexpothat
beganonOctober1st.Privatesectorwork
ershadnosuchluck.Moreover,publicjobs
offernotonlylifetimeemploymentbutal
soannualraises(andotherbenefits)that
oftenoutpacebothinflationandpayin
creasesatprivatefirms.
Butwagesubsidiesareoftenineffective
at tempting ninetofourers to give up
theircushylife.Forprooftheuaeneedon
lylooktonearbyKuwait,whichhasoffered
themsince2001.Dependingoneducation
andfamilysize,someKuwaitiscantake
homealmost$5,000a monthinsalarytop
ups.Theimfestimatedin 2015 thatsubsi
dies cost the government $2bn a year
D UBAI
Subsidiestopullworkersintotheprivatesectorarecostlyandineffective
Public offering
Public-sector employment among nationals
202 or latest available, %
Source:National statistics
Bahrain
Oman
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Qatar
Kuwait
100806040200