52 Middle East & Africa The Economist October 9th 2021
(some of that is siphoned off by“ghost
workers”, who collude with employersto
share the payout).
What subsidies have not done isre
shape Kuwait’s workforce. Since 2005 the
share of publicsector employment
amongst citizens has fallen by justnine
percentage points, to 82%. For thepastfive
years, numbers have moved in thewrong
direction: the number of privatesector
jobs decreased by 3% from 2015to2020,
whereas the civil service swelled by22%,to
338,000 employees.
One reason subsidies fail is thatthey
generally target the wrong people.AKu
waiti with a specialised degree receivesa
subsidy two or three times largerthana
highschool graduate, and almostseven
times more than someone who didnotfin
ish high school. But wage gaps intheGulf
tend to be lowest for highly skilledjobs.An
engineer with a university degreeneeds
less incentive to join a private firmthana
highschool graduate competing with
poorly paid migrants. Employers alsocom
plain that many jobseekers have the
wrong skills. Universities in the Gulfchurn
out lots of graduates with degreesinbusi
ness or the humanities, neitherofwhich
are in high demand.
Subsidies also put governments ina
bind. Though they may lower theinitial
wage gap, they are meant to be temporary
inducements. In time governmentsmust
choose whether to remove them,which
could lead some workers to quit,orkeep
paying them, which is expensive.Some
economists suggest instead settinga mini
mum wage for citizens, which would,inef
fect, pass the costs of subsidies toemploy
ers, with quotas or prohibitive feestostop
them from hiring foreigners. Otherswon
der about a universal basic income,which
would still be expensive but wouldavoid
distorting the labour market.
For all the money they lavish onpublic
employees, though, Gulf governmentsdo
not get much value, in part becauseofa
system that rewards workers basedonse
niority rather than merit. Saudi Arabia
spends 6% of its gdpon education,well
above most countries, but it rankspoorly
in international educational rankings.
The uaeseems to have takensomeof
these issues to heart. It plans to spend1.3bn
dirhams on vocational trainingin such
fields as property management and ac
countancy and to offer scholarshipsfor
nursing degrees. Some of its subsidieswill
also be targeted at finance, healthcareand
property, which have the potentialtoem
ploy lots of people. But those jobsstillneed
to be made more attractive than their
cushy publicsector counterparts.Perhaps
the most useful thing governmentscando
is to make their own penpusherswork
more for less. That would certainlybea
cheaper way to shrink the wage gap.n
Iraq’selection
Boycott the boycott
A
fatwaissuedbyAlialSistani,anin
fluential Grand Ayatollah, was all it
tooktopushIraq’sShiaMuslimsintorisk
ingdeathinbattlewiththejihadistsofIs
lamicStatein2014.Buthisedictsseemto
behavinglesssuccessatpersuadingIraqis
tostrollsedatelytotheballotboothtovote
on October 10th. Although parliament
bowedtothedemandsofyoungprotesters
for anearlyelection, itnowseems that
mostIraqiswillboycotttheevent.Ifthat
happens,sectarianandethnicmilitias,es
peciallythoseclosesttoIran,willprobably
tightentheirgripallthemore.
Iraqis’previousexerciseindemocracy
waslessthanedifying.In 2018 only44%of
thoseeligiblebotheredtocasttheirballots.
Somecompensatedforthelowturnoutby
votingagainandagain.Daysafterparlia
mentordereda recount,a warehousestor
ingamillionballotswentupinflames.
SincethenIraqhasworkedto makethe
coming vote more credible. It has in
creased the number of constituencies,
whichoughttobenefitindependentcandi
dates.Some70%ofvoterswillhavebio
metriccards,whichshouldreducefraud.
Andtherewillbefivetimesasmanyfor
eignmonitorsastherewerein2018,in
cluding,for thefirst time,a contingent
fromtheEuropeanUnion.
Yetapathyandcynicism stillprevail.
Many ofthose inthevanguard ofmass
proteststwoyearsagoarecallingfora boy
cott. “The politicians don’t respect us, so I
don’t respect them,” says one of them, con
vinced that Iraq’s armed factions will never
cede power at the ballot box.
The commonest worry is that, even if
the election itself is fairer than usual, the
horsetrading afterwards will result in yet
another corrupt carveup between the
main factions. Ministries are still likely to
be divided between the biggest parties,
with oil revenues treated as a cashcow to
be shared out, including to party militias.
“They sit in a closed room and choose a
malleable figleaf to represent them,” says
a businessman in Baghdad, referring to the
present prime minister.
Shias, who make up the majority of Ira
qis and live mainly in the centre and south,
have lost the most faith in politics. Two
years ago hundreds of thousands of them
joined the protests, demanding free and
early elections to break the militias’ hold.
But the country’s armed groups have since
grown in power, shooting hundreds dead
with impunity, chasing the protesters off
the streets and quashing their efforts to
form a political movement by killing, kid
napping and intimidating them.
Moreover, lots of independent candi
dates who claim to represent the protesters
are splitting the vote, with the result that
few, if any, will win seats. “Each candidate
feels he alone is king of the protest square,”
says Yasser Mekki, a dentist who joined the
protests in the city of Najaf. Some have
looked to the West to help create a secular
bloc, but America seems to have tired of its
democratising mission.
Further dividing the country is the frac
tiousness of Iraq’s three main groups: Shia,
Sunni and Kurd. The Shias sport an array of
parties, many of which are armed. Sairoun,
which is led by a podgy clericcummilitia
leader, Muqtada alSadr, won the biggest
share of the vote in 2018. But his campaign
in his old base—the shantytowns of Bagh
dad and the cities of the south—has
flagged. This is perhaps because of his par
ty’s failure to use its clout in parliament to
improve the lot of its supporters. Other
armed factions closer to Iran are bidding
for his former voters. Qais alKhazali, the
leader of Asaib Ahl alHaq, a powerful
chain of militias that broke away from Mr
Sadr, now sings to the tune of Ali Khame
nei, Iran’s supreme leader. Kataib Hizbul
lah, another armed Shia group known for
firing rockets at America’s embassy, is
standing for the first time. Several Shia mi
litias have sought Iran’s guidance to save
them from splitting their vote.
One consolation is that the election has
been surprisingly free of violence. But its
outcome will depend on whether people
heed the experience of Sunnis, who lost
out in earlier polls. “We’ve learntourles
son,” says Nada Jabouri, a Sunnicandidate
in Baghdad. “Boycotts don’t work.” n
A low turnout could tighten the grip of
Iraq’s pro-Iranian militias
Billboards aplenty, enthusiasm scanty