198 Trading forest products in South-Eastern Zimbabweof the original studies from 1995 to 1997, Z$400/m^3 , the introduction of a
similar levy paid to the timber producing community would result in a drop in
the net return for labour to the carver to Z$4.79/hour. Using the same
assumptions, a levy or stumpage fee of Z$1,918/m^3 would reduce the net
return to labour to zero. Thus a stumpage fee similar to that of the FC would
make the woodcarving profession unattractive.CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT LESSONS
Any proposal to introduce fiscal tools for conservation must consider the
financial incentives to the producer community as well as the increased costs
and willingness to pay by the resource users. It is possible to define a set of
economic criteria under which institutional change is likely to occur (Ostrom
1998)^3. These state that the net benefit of new institutions, NBnew, should
strongly exceed the net benefit of the old institutions or lack of institutions
(NBold) to the individual. Importantly, institutional change is not costless and
the full costs of the proposed or desired changes need to be considered. These
can be divided into four categories: the time and effort needed to devise and
agree on the new institutions, C 1 ); the direct costs of the new institutions, C 2 ;
the long term monitoring and enforcement costs of the new institutions, C 3 ;
and the opportunity costs foregone, Copp.
If NBnew < NBold it is highly unlikely that institutional change will be possible.
If NBnew = NBold or NBnew > NBold then the probability of institutional change
taking place is increased. Only when the net benefits of the new institutions
strongly outweigh the net benefits of the old institutions, i.e. NBnew >> NBold, is
institutional change likely to occur. In the context of fiscal incentives it is
extremely important that these benefits and costs are clearly identified and
quantified.
The preceding framework considers the probability of institutional change
solely in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. A major constraint to any form of
institutional change for the management of indigenous woodlands in Zimbabwe
is the Communal Lands Forests Products Act, under which the woodcarving
sector and many current uses of woodlands by communal land residents are
illegal (Scoones and Matose 1993; Bird et al. 1995). This is because the act
limits communal land households to non-commercial uses of woodland products,
including wood. The only legitimate commercial marketers of wood and
woodland products from communal lands are the RDCs, which can, in
conjunction with the FC and NRB, grant authority to commercially extract
timber. Because of the emphasis on criminalisation, and the unenforceable
nature of much of the legislation contained within the Communal Lands Forests
Products Act, the Land Tenure Commission Report (Rukuni 1994) recommended
that the act be amended so that ‘communal land farmers can collectively
take responsibility for forests, forest resources, and produce in their areas’.
The experience of the Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) provides a substantial body of evidence
against which the probability of success of fiscal incentives for woodland
management can be assessed. Analysis of the annual gross benefit at household
level has shown that in half of the wards the financial benefits were relatively11woodcarving.p65 198 22/12/2004, 11:05