case in terms of explaining the defendant’s nonchalance
in accepting one of the cash payments.
In State v. Jenkins, 255 N.J. Super. 482, the Court
held that a defendant who engaged in a single effort to
bribe a police officer could not be convicted of both
soliciting the performance of an official duty and
soliciting the violation of an official duty, even though the
defendant repeated his solicitation three times. When
the defendant commits separate acts, however, separate
offenses may be charged, even though there is a temporal
overlap in the offenses and the defendant’s modus
operandi was similar. State v. Catanoso, 269 N.J. Super.
246 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 563
(1993).
E. Civil Remedies
In Hyland v. Simmons, 152 N.J. Super. 569 (Ch. Div.
1977), aff’d 163 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 1978), certif.
denied, 79 N.J. 479 (1979), the court held that, under
the common law of New Jersey, a municipal official who
accepts a bribe pertaining to the performance of his
official duties can be compelled to place the amount of
the bribe into a constructive trust for the benefit of the
municipality. The Attorney General is both an
appropriate plaintiff for such an action and also an
appropriate trustee for such a trust. Because the action is
purely equitable, it is not properly cognizable in the Law
Division and should be heard in the Chancery Division.
Also, because the action is purely equitable, the general
statute of limitations does not apply, and the
discretionary doctrine of laches governs whether the
action should be dismissed for tardiness. The corpus of
the trust may properly include not only the amount of
the bribes received, but also punitive damages.
F. Collateral Liabilities Imposed Upon Those Who Commit Bribery
1. Judges
A judge who commits bribery must be removed from
office. His conviction conclusively establishes the
underlying facts in the removal proceedings. Matter of
Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557 (1984), appeal dismissed 469 U.S.
802 (1984).
- Professional Planners
A professional planner’s conviction for bribery may
be evidential of his misconduct, thus supporting a
revocation of his license, despite his procurement of a
certificate of rehabilitation pursuant to the Rehabilitated
Convicted Offenders Act. Moreover, the planner’s
conviction may be used conclusively to establish the facts
underlying the judgment of conviction. Hyland v.
Kehayas, 157 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div. 1978).3. Lawyers
An attorney’s conviction for bribery or for a
conspiracy to bribe a public official should normally
result in disbarment. The judgment of conviction will be
deemed conclusively to establish the facts underlying the
judgment. In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 36 (1982).An attorney who has been tried for bribery and
acquitted still may be compelled to face disciplinary
proceedings based upon the same alleged misconduct. In
re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518 (1972).4. Government Contractors
The Commissioner of Transportation has the power
to debar a corporation from participating as material men
in State contracts because of the majority stockholder’s
conviction for bribery and obstructing justice. Trap Rock
Industries, Inc. v. Kohl, 63 N.J. 1 (1973), cert. denied 414
U.S. 860 (1973); see also, Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v.
Sagner, 69 N.J. 599 (1976).G. Grading
The last paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 provides:Any offense proscribed by this section is a crime of the
second degree. If the benefit offered, conferred, agreed to
be conferred, solicited, accepted or agreed to be accepted
is of the value of $200 or less, any offense proscribed by
this section is a crime of the third degree.The Legislature has chosen to grade four offenses - namely
bribery (N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2), compensation for past
official behavior (N.J.S.A. 2C:27-4), unlawful compen-
sation of a public servant (N.J.S.A. 2C:27-7), and
compounding (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-4) -- in precisely the
same manner. In each instance the Legislature has
specified the interdicted conduct to be an offense of the
second degree. In certain instances, however, the
conduct is a crime of only the third degree. To fall within
this lenient grading, the benefit must be pecuniary in
nature, and must be capable of being measured, by an
objective standard, to have a value of $200 or less. Unless
the benefit is pecuniary in nature, and regardless of how
significant the benefit may be, the conduct constitutes a