preferred the trial court to adjudicate post-conviction
relief claims on their merits, especially in capital cases. Id.
at 147-54.
With regard to evidentiary hearings on post-
conviction relief petitions, such a hearing should be held
only if a defendant has made a prima facie case in support
of post-conviction relief, i.e., demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood that the claim will ultimately succeed on the
merits. Id. at 157-58. A hearing need not be held if the
court perceives that it will not aid the trial court’s analysis
of the entitlement to relief or if the defendant’s
allegations are too vague, conclusory or speculative to
warrant a hearing. Id. at 158.
A defendant has no right -- constitutional, statutory
or common law -- to inspect the State’s file during post-
conviction proceedings. Id. at 272-75. However, a trial
court has the inherent right to compel discovery during
these proceedings, but it should be exercised only “in the
unusual case,” since the filing of a post-conviction relief
petition “is not license to obtain unlimited information
from the State... .” Id. at 270. Any discovery order
should be appropriately narrow and limited; a defendant
should identify the specific documents sought for
production, and the court may view the documents in
camera before determining whether to issue a discovery
order. Id. at 270-71.
R. 1:16-1, which prevents post-trial contact with
jurors without the approval of the court, does not violate
a defendant’s First Amendment rights. The compelling
public interest in protecting jurors and their
deliberations amply justifies restrictions on contacting
jurors without good cause. Id. at 280. When a defendant
raises an incompetency of counsel claim and defense
counsel testifies, the defendant waives the attorney-client
privilege. State Bey V, 161 N.J. 233, 296 (1999).
Moreover, the attorney client privilege does not extend to
communications relevant to incompetency of counsel
claims. Id.
CARJACKINGCARJACKINGCARJACKINGCARJACKINGCARJACKING
A defendant who, in the course of committing an
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, (1) inflicts bodily
injury or uses force upon an occupant or person in
possession or control of a motor vehicle; (2) threatens an
occupant or person in control of the vehicle with, or
purposely or knowingly puts an occupant or person in
control of the motor vehicle in fear of immediate bodily
injury; or (3) commits or threatens to commit any crime
of the first or second degree; or (4) operates or causes the
vehicle to be operated with the person who was in
possession or control or was an occupant of the motor
vehicle at the time of the taking remaining in the vehicle
is guilty of carjacking. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2a.An act is deemed “in the course of committing an
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle” if it occurs during an
attempt to commit the unlawful taking or during an
immediate flight after the attempt or commission. Id.While carjacking is a crime of the first degree,
nonetheless the ordinary term of imprisonment is
between 10 and 30 years. A person convicted of
carjacking who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment
must receive a term of at least five years of parole
ineligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2b.In State v. Williams, 289 N.J. Super. 611, 616 (App.
Div. 1996), the Court pointed out that the carjacking
statute does not require that the defendant use force
against an occupant of a vehicle only when the victim is
within the actual structure of the vehicle. Rather, the
broad aim of the statute is to deal with persons who use
force or intimidation to gain possession of a motor
vehicle. Thus, under the statute whether the occupant or
person in possession or control over the automobile is
actually situated within the structure of the vehicle when
force is employed or threatened is irrelevant.However, for purposes of a lesser included offense
determination, robbery and theft are not within the four
corners of a carjacking indictment when the theft
underlying the robbery was the undisputed wrongful
taking of the victim’s automobile directly from the
occupant. State v. Garretson, 313 N.J. Super. 348, 359
(App. Div. 1998).When a defendant does not request a jury charge on
a lesser-included offense or offenses, such as robbery,
assault and theft from the person, the trial court is not
required to provide such an instruction. State v.
Matarama, 306 N.J. Super. 6, 21 (App. Div. 1997), certif.