denied, 153 N.J. 50 (1998). But if there is a rational basis
for an affirmative defense of renunciation -- see N.J.S.A.
2C:5-1d, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2e, and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6e(3) –-
when a defendant requests such a charge, the trial court
must instruct the jury on this defense. State v. Alston, 311
N.J. Super. 113, 121 (App. Div. 1998).
Under the statute, the proximity of the victim to his
or her vehicle is significant, since under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
2a(2), “the State must present evidence on the issue of
proximity to prove that the victim was either an
‘occupant or in control of’ the vehicle.” State v. Jenkins,
321 N.J. Super. 124, 131 (App. Div. 1999). See N.J.S.A.
2C:15-2a(2). Therefore, the victim’s proximity to the
vehicle “clearly bears on the victim’s capacity to control
the vehicle, either in terms of the victim’s own ability to
operate it or to bar entry by others, and also to establish
that the defendant’s actions exposed the victim to a
particular risk of harm beyond mere loss of the vehicle.
To sustain a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2a(2), the
State must prove the “occupant or person in control” of
the vehicle was placed within a “heightened zone of
danger” with relationship to the car. A victim’s
constructive possession of a vehicle, which he or she did
not occupy or control at the time of the assault, is
insufficient to support a carjacking conviction under
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2a(2).
The use of the carjacked vehicle in the commission of
a crime cannot be used as an aggravating factor in
determining sentence because it would result in double
counting, since the vehicle used was the victim’s. State v.
Henry, 323 N.J. Super. 157, 165 (App. Div. 1999).
CAUSATIONCAUSATIONCAUSATIONCAUSATIONCAUSATION
I. HISTORY
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3 substantially changed the way in
which problems of causation were dealt with under prior
law. Pre-Code law required that when causing a
particular result was a material element of the offense, the
State had to prove that the defendant’s conduct was both
the actual and the proximate cause of the result with
which he had been charged. See State v. Weiner, 41 N.J.
21, 36 (1963) (conviction reversed for prosecution’s
failure to prove which proposed theory of alleged
criminally negligent conduct actually caused victims’
deaths); State v. Reitz, 86 N.J.L. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1914)
(death must be “the natural and proximate result ...;
criminal responsibility depends upon whether or not the
injury which caused the death was the regular, natural
and likely consequence of defendant’s conduct”).Under the Code, the actual “but for” causal
relationship is regarded as sufficient and issues involving
proximate causation, such as knowledge or forseeability,
become relevant to the actor’s culpability (i.e. his
purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence). The
reasoning behind the change goes to the issue of double
counting. “When concepts of ‘proximate causation’
disassociate the actor’s conduct from a result of which it
was a but-for cause, the reason always inheres in the
judgment that the actor’s culpability with reference to
the result ... was such that it would be unjust to permit
the result to influence his liability or the gravity of the
offense of which he is convicted.” II Final Report of New
Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission: Commentary
(1971) at 49-50.
Also, the Code abolished the common law limitation
on murder prosecutions where the deceased had to have
died no later than one year after the homicidal attack. See
e.g. State v. Young, 77 N.J. 245 (1978); see also N.J.S.A.
2C:11-2.1.II. DEFINITION
Conduct is the cause of a result when (1) it is the
antecedent but for which the result in question would not
have occurred; and (2) the relationship between the
conduct and result satisfies any additional causal
requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining
the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3a.