of the obvious risks surrounding the attempts to execute
the conspiracy, and (3) whether the crime was
committed in a manner too far removed or too remote
from the objectives of the original conspiracy. Id.
B. Reckless or Criminally Negligent Conduct ....................................................................................
When an offense requires that the defendant
recklessly or criminally negligently cause a particular
result, the actual result must be within the risk of which
the actor is aware, or, in the case of criminal negligence,
of which he should be aware. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3c.
If the actual result is not within the risk of which the
actor is or should be aware, it must involve the same kind
of injury or harm as the probable result and must not be
too remote, accidental in its occurrence, or dependent on
another’s volitional act to have a just bearing on the
actor’s liability or on the gravity of the offense. Id.
In Jamerson, supra, defendant was convicted of
reckless manslaughter based, in part, on operating an
automobile while intoxicated. 153 N.J. at 324. At trial,
defendant tried to show that he did not satisfy the reckless
standard because the victim’s vehicle ran a stop sign. Id.
On appeal, defendant challenged as reversible error
testimony presented by a forensic expert that defendant
was driving recklessly at the time of the incident. Id. The
Appellate Division held that the expert’s testimony was
harmless error. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the forensic expert was not
qualified to give such testimony, and that the victim’s
intervening act of failing to stop at a stop sign, if proved,
would have broken the requisite causal link. Id. at 336.
However, in an aggravated manslaughter case, where
another defendant, who was driving while intoxicated,
rear-ended the victim’s vehicle and killed him, the
Appellate Division held that the victim’s failure to wear
his seatbelt at the time was within the risk of which
defendant should have been aware and, while it may have
been a contributing cause, it did not absolve defendant of
his responsibility. State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J. Super. 557,
570 (App. Div. 1989), aff’d o.b., 121 N.J. 527 (1990).
In a death by auto case, where two co-defendants
engaged their vehicles in a game of “cat and mouse”,
resulting in the death of a third driver, a jury had to find
that the recklessness of either co-defendant must have
proximately caused the death in order to hold them
criminally responsible. State v. Brown 228 N.J. Super.
211, 224-25 (App. Div.), reversed on other grounds, 118
N.J. 595 (1988).IV. TRANSFERRED INTENT
A defendant is not relieved of responsibility for
causing a result if the only difference between what
actually occurred and what was designed, contemplated
or risked is that a different person or property was injured,
or that a less serious or less extensive injury occurred.
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3d.A defendant who shoots and kills one victim with the
intent to cause that victim’s death, and in the course of
that conduct also kills another, unintended victim, can
be found guilty of murdering the unintended victim.
State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 615-17 (1990).
“[T]ransferred intent” does not apply solely to situations
in which only the unintended victim is harmed. Id. at
617.The general principle that the intent of an act
determines the legal character of its consequences,
though they operate upon a different person than the one
intended, applies to statutory as well as common-law
crimes. State v. Gallagher, 83 N.J.L. 321 (1912).A juvenile who intended to kick another student, but
who instead kicked a teacher trying to break up the fight,
was not guilty of aggravated assault against the teacher
because he did not have the specific intent to assault a
teacher engaged in the performance of his duties
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5)(d). State in the Interest
of S.B., 333 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 2000). However,
the juvenile could be adjudicated delinquent on a charge
of simple assault, if committed by an adult, as a lesser
included offense. The juvenile could not avoid criminal
responsibility merely because his intended victim was the
other juvenile rather than the teacher. Id.V. STRICT LIABILITY CRIMES
When causing a particular result is a material element
of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by
law, the element of causation is not established unless the
actual result is a probable consequence of the actor’s
conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-3e.Historically, there have been only two strict liability
crimes: felony murder and drug-induced deaths.
However, in 1992, the Legislature added three others.
Id. The first is the addition of a third category to